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Natural disasters can cause severe damage to infrastructure, the economy, and human lives. 
A better understanding of the vulnerability of individual households, critical infrastructure, and a 
community can be vital to in both short-term disaster response and long-term resilience planning. 
This dissertation develops methods to analyze the long-term vulnerability of communities when 
facing repeated hurricanes and heat waves in a changing climate, as well as the short-term 
vulnerability of power systems under different types of disasters. The approaches I develop are a 
combination of simulation modeling, predictive modeling, and network theory. 
The first chapter of this dissertation describes the vulnerability of communities when facing 
different hazardous events, such as hurricanes, heat waves, and power outages. The second 
chapter focuses on enhancing understanding of the long-term vulnerability of a community under 
repeated hurricanes. I discuss how learning, initial beliefs and memory decay effects influence 
individual decisions and change regional vulnerability under different hurricane climate 
scenarios. We found how different initial knowledge and the memory effect can result in 
different community vulnerability under different hurricane climate scenarios. The third chapter 
develops methods for estimating power system damage and power outages from extreme weather 
events. I use publicly available data to generate the layout of the distribution system which is not 
publicly available in most cases. I then use the synthetic distribution layout to simulate damage 




understand regional and individual power outage risks. The fourth chapter studies how the long-
term vulnerability of a community may change under repeated heat waves. I build an agent-
based model to address the interplay of the vulnerability of community, climate change, 
individual mitigation, social networks, power outages, and government mitigation. The model 
shows how each component is triggering the evolution of community heat vulnerability with 
historical events and what-if scenarios. The fifth chapter summarizes this dissertation and 
discusses potential limitations and future directions of this study. 
Overall, this work develops new methods to study the vulnerability of communities under 
repeat natural disasters aiming to enhance better short-term response and long-term planning. 
These models can help decision-makers, policy-makers, and individuals to make better plans 








Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Repeated natural disasters cause severe damage to human lives, infrastructure, and the 
economy. To understand how to mitigate effectively, we must understand the vulnerability of the 
community from different perspectives including individual, infrastructure, and the government. 
This work divides vulnerability into long-term and short-term and studies both of them. Long-
term vulnerability is a measure of how well or bad a community responds to natural disaster in a 
dynamic scenario, where the people, climate, land use, etc. can be changing over time. Short-
term vulnerability describes the risks to a community of being damaged from a specific event, 
which can be reflected from mortality, building or infrastructure damage, or loss of life essentials 
such as electricity power and drinking water. I build simulation models with data analytics 
approaches to address critical questions that enhance our understanding of both the short-term 
and long-term vulnerability. 
1.1 Hurricanes 
Hurricanes cause considerable damage to human lives, properties, infrastructure, and the 
economy. Hurricane Irma in 2017 caused approximately $42.5 to $65 billion (USD) in total 
property damage according to some estimates1. Hurricane Sandy in 2012 led to 8.2 million 
customers losing power. Hurricane Maria caused more than 4000 deaths. People and 






the vulnerability in the long run(1). However, to comprehensively understand how to decrease the 
long-term hurricane vulnerability, further studies into the mitigation efforts made by individual 
households and the government under a changing climate is crucial.  
Household-level mitigation has been studied from multiple perspectives, including what 
mitigation actions a household can take (2), cost-effectiveness analysis of different measures to 
increase hurricane resistance (3), and the demographics, wealth, hurricane experiences of the 
homeowners and the decisions they made (4,5). Government mitigation efforts, on the other hand, 
have also been well studied from the measures (incentives, policies) to their effectiveness (6). 
However, most of these studies stem from a specific event or from a specific region, which 
decrease the generalizability of the results from these studies.  
Another challenge comes from climate change, which could be game-changing to all existing 
policies and preparations. However, the relationship between climate change and hurricane 
occurrences is not fully understood, which increases the difficulty in predicting, planning, and 
adapting especially when rare events happen, e.g. hurricane Katerina, 2005 (7). To fill this gap in 
long-term hurricane vulnerability studies, we must first address the effect of individual 
household learning, which changes the mitigation decisions one makes. This in turn changes the 
regional vulnerability overall. Learning is the most important process that enables the adaptation 
to an unknown environment (8).  
To understand how the effect of learning changes the vulnerability of communities under 
repeated hurricanes, I built an agent-based model (ABM) that focuses on the influence of 
individual learning effects on homeowner decisions, which thus affect regional vulnerability to 
the residential building stock. The resulting model can not only answer our questions about the 




decaying to the change of community vulnerability, but it can also serve as a platform for 
analyzing how hazard experiences and government policies influence one’s understanding of the 
risk and how this causes communities to change through mitigation and possibly even retreat. 
1.2 Heat waves 
Heat waves are another type of natural disaster that leads to deaths and in some cases 
damages infrastructure. Unlike hurricanes, the effects heat waves are felt primarily in specific 
population groups such as older individuals with health conditions, and those who are socially 
isolated. There is little research on how long-term heat wave vulnerability changes in a 
community. Most existing research focuses on a specific event (9,10), or a certain impact . To 
understand the vulnerability of a community facing heat waves, I must understand the three 
sources that can change vulnerability over time: individual mitigation behaviors, social networks, 
and government interventions. For individual households, the most effective mitigation for heat 
waves is to invest an Air Conditioning unit (A/C). However, this can be prohibitively costly to 
families with limited budgets. People can also mitigate through their social networks by getting 
invited to the house of a friend with A/C to avoid heat exposure. However, the effectiveness of 
mitigation from social networks has not been well-understood. The government, in the 
meantime, can open cooling centers to host people in need. To understand the impacts of three 
facets of heat wave mitigation, we need a platform that can systematically model these elements 
while remaining grounded in reality. 
To answer these questions, I build an agent-based model to help understand the long-term 
vulnerability from heat waves. I model a heat wave environment, where individuals can learn 
from heat wave events, make mitigation decisions, get help from their social connections, and 




coverage ratio of A/C to quantify the vulnerability of the region.  Through this model, I can run 
different scenarios to test how each component in the process would change the evolution of the 
region’s heat vulnerability. 
1.3 Power outages 
Most power outages are caused by weather-related events, and power outages cause 
inconvenience, economic losses, and loss of human lives (11). They can be triggered by both 
hurricanes and heat waves among many other types of weather events and can be impactful to 
household mitigation behaviors (12). A good estimation of the severity and spatial distribution of 
power outages ahead of a forecast event can speed up the response from utility companies and 
reduce costs when planning personnel and restoration materials. Detailed power outage 
likelihood forecasts can also help homeowners to better understand and improve their local 
resilience through considerations of back-up power, power disruption insurance (for a 
commercial entity), and other measures. Two different routes are taken when studying power 
outage predictions: statistical-based approaches and fragility-based approaches.  
Statistical-based approaches has been used in practice and studied by many (13–16). These 
approaches rely on historical power outage records with covariates such as hazard information, 
weather, land use, land topology, and tree cover/species, to build statistical learning models to 
make predictions for future events (16). In practice, these models require the collection of all the 
covariates in real time, and the covariates and predictions are restricted to the same spatial scale 
defined by the dataset, e.g., county level or grid cell level. These limitations pose challenges in 
using validating models for real-time predictions. 
Fragility-based model uses fragility curves for critical power infrastructure assets to simulate 




limitation of this approach is that the deployment of infrastructure that are susceptible to 
damages, e.g. power lines, power poles, and the way they are connected from customers to 
substations are not publicly available due to security concerns.  
This work develops a new method that fills the gap of the unknown distribution grid by 
synthetically generating it with publicly available information. I validate the generated network 
with an actual distribution grid and use the network to simulate two historical power outage 
events. 
1.4 Bottom-up approaches 
 
Bottom-up and Top-down approaches are two different frameworks widely used in research 
studies. Experts from different fields might have different definitions of these two approaches. In 
general, top-down approach models start from an overview of the major question, breaking this 
down to smaller questions, and explore answers to each of those until gaining an understanding 
of the system. Typical top-down approaches used in risk analysis are predictive modeling, 
system dynamics models, and related approaches. Bottom-up approaches, on the other hand, start 
from modeling each component of the system to create interactions and rules until reaching to an 
acceptable level of completeness to describe, reflect, or represent the complex system. Typical 
bottom-up approaches used in risk analysis are agent-based modeling and component-based 
fragility assessment. There are several benefits of bottom-up approaches. First, bottom-up 
approaches start from each component of the system. One can easily model the interaction of 
those components and observe the changes due to those interactions. This is a major benefit of 
bottom-up approaches in comparison to top-down models, where the latter are often used like a 




to communicate with other researchers or the public, as each component is normally modeled in 
a simplified way to represent the reality. The third advantage is that bottom-up approaches can 
be flexible to incorporate new modules. It is a very convenient boundary object in 
interdisciplinary studies and can be used to answer what-if questions with introducing additional 
components that may or may not change the output.  
In this work, I am modeling the complex system with a bottom-up approach starting from the 
individual level for both community vulnerability studies and the power outage study. This is a 
novel contribution to these fields as in the past, the importance of individuals are not well-
studied, or individuals are not getting informed as an important responder to the potential risks 
they might be facing. In community vulnerability studies, each single family or individual is the 
agent in our agent-based model, and I focus on how they are learning, adapting, and making 
mitigation decisions can potentially decrease the long-term vulnerability of the community. In 
the power outage studies, I use a simulation-based method to estimate the risk of each individual 
building losing power, which provides a metric to support individual homeowners and business 
owners when making decisions on back up power to protect normal lives and business 
continuity. I use bottom-up approaches to create models from building level, therefore I can get 
the flexibility to aggregate the output to whatever resolution I want. 
 
1.5 Overview 
This dissertation consists of three independent projects that enhance the understanding of 
long-term vulnerability of communities under repeated natural disaster events such as hurricanes 
and heat waves and develop innovative model to estimate short-term vulnerability due to 




Chapter 2: Individual Learning as a Driver of the Evolution of Community Vulnerability 
under Repeated Hurricane Hazards and Climate Change - I create an agent-based model in nine 
counties in Maryland that can be used to study the long-term vulnerability of hurricanes for 
different hurricane climate scenarios. I reveal the impact of learning, initial beliefs, and memory 
decaying effect on the evolution of community vulnerability. I find that the initial beliefs held by 
homeowners can have long-term impact on the vulnerability of a community especially when the 
hurricanes become more frequent and intense. And because of the nature of human memory, 
post-disaster is the best time to encourage mitigation and decrease the vulnerability. 
Chapter 3: Evolution of vulnerability under repeated heat waves - I built an agent-based 
model that integrates a synthetic heatwave model, dynamically evolving agents, social 
connections, and a health mortality model to study the impact of repeated heatwaves on the 
vulnerability of the community. I calibrate our model with available historical data and study 
multiple scenarios to reveal how individual decisions, social network, and government policies 
can increase or decrease mitigate heat wave damages. I find that social invitations and cooling 
centers are very critical mitigation in reducing mortality. Without social invitations, though the 
A/C penetration ratio becomes the highest, the overall mortality is the highest. 
Chapter 4: Power Outage Prediction for Natural Hazards Using Synthetic Power Distribution 
Systems - I develop an innovative method to generate synthetic distribution grid and how to use 
these to simulate power outages during hazards. I validate our network with Columbus, OH’s 
actual distribution system. I identify the model with the best performance for network generation 
and showed the performance of the model in power outage prediction for the Derecho in 2012 in 
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Chapter 2: Learning as a Driver of Changing Community Vulnerability under 





Hurricanes regularly cause large economic losses and loss of life along the Gulf and Atlantic 
Coasts of the U.S. The risks from individual hurricanes has been extensively investigated in the 
literature. However, little is understood about how individual and collective responses to 
repeated hazards change communities and impact their preparation for future events.  Individual 
mitigation actions may drive how a community's resilience evolves under repeated hazards. In 
this chapter, we investigate the effect that learning by homeowners has on household mitigation 
decisions and on how this influences a region's vulnerability to hurricanes over time. To do this, 
we utilize an Agent-Based Model (ABM) to simulate homeowners’ adaptation to repeated 
hurricanes and how this affects the vulnerability of the regional housing stock. We use a case 
study to explore how different initial beliefs about the hurricane hazard and how the memory of 
recent hurricanes could change a community’s vulnerability both under current and potential 
future hurricane scenarios under climate change. In some future hurricane environments, 
different initial beliefs can result in large differences in the region’s long-term vulnerability to 
hurricanes. We find that getting some homeowners to mitigate soon after a hurricane – when 







Natural disasters cause considerable property damage and economic loss. In 2017, three 
major hurricanes, Harvey, Irma, and Maria, made landfall, caused more than $300 billion (USD) 
in economic loss, damaged more than a million homes, and left misery in their wake(1). 
Hurricane Irma caused approximately $70 billion (USD) in total economic loss, and half of that 
was due to damage to residential real estate(2). Residential building vulnerability is a critical 
component of a region’s financial vulnerability when facing disasters. Low penetration rates of 
flood insurance in most coastal communities often mean that a singular event can erase a 
family’s most valuable asset(3,4). Further, it can take months or even years after a disaster, 
depending on the availability of financial assistance, contractors, post-disaster economic 
opportunities, among other factors, before displaced families return to their homes and repair 
houses to normal, putting the long-term future of the community at risk(5). While there have been 
studies examining building stock vulnerability to hurricanes, most either, (1) assume that 
building stock is static(6) or (2) exogenously impose a change to the building stock within a 
hazard simulation model(7). This ignores the potential endogenous learning that stems from 
experience with hurricanes that could substantially alter the building stock over time.  
Changes in building stock are part of the larger problem of estimating damage from repeated 
events. Singular hazard events are well-studied, and risk analysis methods are well developed for 
these events. For example,  hundreds of studies have been published on the aftermath of 
Superstorm Sandy, ranging from evacuation(8), to nursing homes and elderly care(9) , to 
hardening the New York City and the New Jersey coastline to reduce damage should a similar 




induce long-term changes to communities, and more specifically, how hazards change behaviors 
and policies which in turn influence the built environment.  These alterations to the built 
environment change a community’s ability to withstand future events.  
There are numerous aspects of communities and their hazards that impact a community’s 
long-term hazard vulnerability. These include decisions made by collective bodies to invest in 
large-scale protective infrastructure(11,12), land-use changes(12), and climate change(13). An 
additional source of change stems from the actions (or lack thereof) by individuals(11). These 
decisions result from their knowledge about the risk that hazards pose and personal preferences 
regarding individual risk tolerances and the opportunity costs of these decisions(14).  
Additionally, heuristics and biases can induce decisions that, based on the information at hand, 
seem counterproductive(12). Repeated hazards provide experiences from which those affected 
learn, and thus induce changes to the decision-making process regarding preparation and 
mitigation. With each new observation (i.e., a new hazardous event), individuals incorporate 
their new knowledge and update their beliefs about the risks associated with hazards(11). This 
influences their actions and changes the trajectory of the region’s vulnerability to hazards.  
To better understand how regional vulnerability can evolve, we must first better understand 
the potential contributions of individual-level learning to regional risk. This is particularly 
critical in communities exposed to repeated hazards as the effects of this learning, and the 
decisions that follow, compound over time. There is not one way in which individuals 
understand and respond to hazard risk and different beliefs about risk can lead to different 
mitigation behaviors. It is important to understand the influence that archetypical behaviors have 
over time on community vulnerability to identify when interventions are warranted. For example, 




sway even when their understanding of the hazard is updated by a new experience(15). But the 
impact of this behavior as it compounds over time differs depending on location and climate 
intensification. The role of memory also influences behavior in a way that has compounding 
effects. More recent hazard experiences tend to increase an individual’s risk perception and 
decrease their risk tolerance, making individuals more likely to mitigate. When significant time 
passes between storms, individuals are less likely to be prepared and have a lower likelihood of 
mitigating in a given year(16). This is called the memory decay effect(12). Similarly, availability 
bias in hazard decision-making occurs when individuals rely more on recent experiences than on 
their full experience(17).  
In this chapter, we evaluate how learning from repeated events may influence how 
community vulnerability. We allow probabilistic beliefs about the frequency and intensity of 
hurricanes to evolve over time to evaluate how this may influence community-level risk. We 
show that even learning about a single aspect of the risk can create a large difference in how 
community risk – as measured by building stock vulnerability – evolves over time. This study 
investigates two specific questions: (1) When does learning from the hazard environment and 
from information campaigns decrease homeowners’ vulnerability to repeated hurricanes in a 
changing climate? (2) How does the effect of memory influence a region’s vulnerability in the 
long term? This work provides a platform for analyzing how hazard experiences influence one’s 
understanding of the risk and how this causes communities to change through mitigation and 
possibly even retreat.  
To accomplish this, we developed an agent-based model (ABM) that focuses on the influence 
of individual learning on homeowner decisions and then how these decisions affect regional 




the effects of memory, and the confidence that homeowners have in their own beliefs about 
hazard risk. In the model, homeowners make decisions by choosing from a set of mitigation 
actions (e.g., installing hurricane shutters or hurricane straps). The approach is place-based, with 
a case study area based on 357,120 individual homeowners across nine coastal counties in the 
state of Maryland. However, both the models and insights are generalizable to other areas. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We first review the literature of relevant studies as 
the construction of such models is highly interdisciplinary. We start by giving an overview of the 
literature on (1) vulnerability to and mitigation of hurricanes, (2) the use of ABMs in natural 
disaster studies, and (3) hurricanes and climate change. In Section 3, we introduce the framework 
of ABM, which includes a hazard model, a damage model, and models for individual learning 
and individual mitigation decisions. The case study is presented in Section 4 and details of model 
evaluation are presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we show results, including how model can be 
used with different climate scenarios, and discuss the role of learning, the impact of initial 
perception of hurricane risks, and the impact of memory decay.   
 
2.3 Background 
2.3.1 Hurricane vulnerability and mitigation 
 
Systems-level research on hurricane risk typically focuses on quantifying regional damage, 
the benefits and cost-effectiveness of mitigation, and how federal and local policies may induce 
homeowners to mitigate their risks of being damaged to reduce region-wide vulnerability. We 




framework to simulate hazards and hazard impact, including estimates of economic losses from 
infrastructure and residential housing damage(7,18,19). HAZUS uses a whole-entity approach to 
modeling; each building class is assigned a hazard fragility curve (derived from the literature, 
reconnaissance, and experimental testing), which is based on a conditional probability of damage 
state given a hazard intensity. For example, for a hurricane, the intensity measure is typically 
gust wind speed. This can be too simplistic, especially when considering an individual house in a 
specific location. However, on a regional-scale, it provides an approximation of the expected 
building damage given a hazard. HAZUS has additional known shortcomings, including out-of-
date building stock, crude hurricane and flooding scenarios – mostly accredited to 
accommodating the computational limits of most users – and deterministic hazard scenario 
modeling. Despite these limitations, it offers both an easy-to-use platform for researchers and 
practitioners to test hypotheses and its ubiquity has allowed for comparison among studies. 
Component-based approaches, on the other hand, are more granular. They focus on the 
vulnerability of individual building components, and the interactions among them, providing 
more accurate estimates of singular building damage(20–22). This approach requires significantly 
more knowledge of the building stock and computational resources. Our work relies on the 
whole-entity approach given its ubiquity and less inputs requirements. We do not use HAZUS 
directly, but we do use the building fragility curves provide by HAZUS. This allows us to 
overcome problems surrounding out-of-date building stock and crude hazard scenarios while still 
leveraging the HAZUS fragility functions.  
Mitigation reduces the likelihood that a building experiences damage due to a hurricane. This 
chapter focuses on household-level mitigation, such as adding wind-straps or hurricane shutters. 




Pinelli et al. (2009) studied the cost effectiveness of various mitigation strategies using a Monte 
Carlo simulation for different regions in Florida and created a map indicating the benefit/cost 
effectiveness for different combinations of housing mitigation decisions(24). Rose et al. 
contributes to this discussion on the cost effectiveness of mitigation using empirical data on 
hazard mitigation grants(25). They find a 4.7-fold return-on-investment for wind mitigation from 
FEMA mitigation grants – grants given to communities particularly susceptible to high 
windspeeds. These studies, and others like it, assume a static building stock and do not include 
the compounding benefits from mitigation from repeated hazard events.   
Additional considerations for understanding how regional building stock vulnerability may 
change include homeowners’ proclivity towards mitigation and federal, state, and local policies 
that influence homeowner mitigation behavior. Federal policies are also commonly evaluated 
with benefit-cost analysis or survey-based approaches(26), though these too are often based on a 
static snapshot of the situation.  
Little of this past work has explicitly investigated the effects of repeated hurricanes – and 
their effects on mitigation behavior - on communities with the exception of Jain et al., Reilly et 
al.(7,11,27). Jain et al. propose a method to consider temporal changes in building inventory when 
estimating changes in expected losses from hurricanes over time(7). This simulation model 
considers how building vulnerability responds to changes in building codes. Reilly et al. model 
that homeowners can increase their houses resistance to wind following a set of different rules 
defined following rules defined by probabilistic distributions. However, these studies do not 
explicitly investigate the potential role of learning as a determinant of long-term building stock 
vulnerability. Other studies that do consider the role of sequential hazards focus more on the 




the importance past flooding experiences and how they might change people’s risk perception 
and motivate mitigation behavior. Their survey results suggested that negative experiences 
increase the likelihood of household mitigation behaviors but not necessarily when people also 
doubt the effectiveness of mitigation or perceive the cost as too high. Better understanding this 
potential role of learning is critical in understanding repeated hazards and their impacts on 
communities over time.  
2.3.2 Agent-based models and their use in natural disaster studies 
 
An ABM is a bottom-up in silico modeling approach that simulates how heterogeneous 
agents (e.g., homeowners) interact with and learn from other agents and the environment and 
how, with this knowledge, they make decisions(29,30). Their decisions then change the 
environment – and in our case, their homes. ABMs have been broadly used in tackling problems 
involving humans and their decisions. Applications of ABMs span demography, the social 
sciences, economics, public health and environmental science among other fields(31,32). 
The primary benefit of ABMs is that they allow researchers to create a large collection of 
scenarios (e.g., different policy alternatives or learning behaviors) to conduct sensitivity analysis 
which facilitates answering various questions under different circumstances(14). This allow 
researchers to quantify the impact of various interventions (e.g., mitigation policies) or 
exogenous changes to the hazard environment (e.g., via climate change). Compared to top-down 
modeling approaches, which include statistical and optimization models, another benefit of 
ABMs are their ability to model the compounding effects of individual actions and learning(27).  
The results from ABM simulations are challenging, and often impossible, to validate due to the 




observed in reality yet(14). This is overcome by using behaviors and environments that have been 
observed by researchers or practitioners. For example, an ABM can be calibrated to past 
observed patterns, and behavioral models can be based on real-world surveys or observations of 
behavior. ABMs provide an advantage in that the scenarios that are examined need not have 
occurred, unlike e.g., statistical models which rely upon prior data. ABM output is often high-
dimensional and usually requires sophisticated analytical approaches to interpret. One approach 
that can help in comparing different scenarios is using common random numbers. This reduces 
the variance of the differences between scenarios by fixing the randomness of the input, thus 
making the underlying differences from scenarios more obvious. 
ABMs have been widely used to model natural disasters and their impacts. ABMs are useful 
boundary objects able integrate domain knowledge from multiple disciplines, making them 
increasingly popular (33). However, most ABM work in the hazards realm centers around short-
term actions after hazards occur to evaluate how agents might evacuate, take shelter, or access 
primary care services, and what infrastructure is needed to accommodate emergent behaviors(34–
36). An ABM could be used to model the long-term effects of natural disasters(11,27,37). For 
example, Reilly et al. (2018) quantified how hurricane-induced power outages that induce 
particular behaviors, may, in turn, influence a region's power system reliability in the long-run.  
 
2.3.3 Modeling Individual Learning in ABMs 
 
People’s behaviors are driven, in part, by their beliefs(38) and preferences(39). Beliefs can 




or through information shared others – and then update their understanding of the process. 
Because learning affects how individuals make decisions over time, learning can be an essential 
component in an ABM framework for studying long-term implications of hazard 
vulnerability(40). In ABMs, agents are considered autonomous and can interact with one another, 
meaning they can learn from both the environment and from other agents.  
Learning can be viewed as a process in which beliefs are updated. In reality, this process is 
complex and is the subject of numerous psychological studies(41). In an ABM, however, learning 
is modeled in a logical structure compatible with computer coding. There are several ways to 
model this process in an ABMs. The primary methods include information modeling, Bayesian 
updating, reinforcement learning, and coevolutionary algorithms. We briefly review each below. 
A common approach – information modeling or risk modeling – uses new information about 
disasters and risks perceived by the agents as the knowledge learned by the agents.  For example, 
Du et al. explored evacuation processes during flooding events using an ABM(42). In this study, 
agents learn of a flood from a news broadcast, social media, and neighbor observations, which, 
when combined, triggers decisions by agents. In other work, Tonn et al. quantifies how different 
risk perception factors (i.e., flood experiences) and coping perception factors (i.e., mitigation 
behaviors) combine to estimate perceived risk factors. This value will then be compared with a 
risk tolerance threshold to determine when an agent will consider taking action (37). 
Bayesian learning or Bayesian updating is another approach for modeling learning(38). This 
method assumes an agent’s beliefs about future events, such as the likelihood of a hurricane, 
follow specified probability distributions. These distributions are updated as new information 
becomes available using Bayes theorem. For example, Reilly et al. (2017) modelled agents as 




in a given year(11). This is then combined with Dirichlet conjugate priors which are updated in a 
Bayesian manner every year given the number of power outages that occurred.  
Another popular learning algorithm used in ABMs is reinforcement learning(39). In 
reinforcement learning, agents receive rewards from their actions, and they make decisions based 
on a new environment and the consequences caused by their prior actions. Krause et al. model 
the process of power suppliers submitting their bids to the electricity market using reinforcement 
learning(43). The agents are trying to maximize their payoffs and after each bid, they observe their 
gains or losses to update their behavioral policies or expected reward functions. As a result, they 
discover that after many rounds of bidding, the stable decisions each agent made to achieve their 
optimal output is the same as the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium or multiple equilibria in 
the system. 
For each learning method, it is possible to incorporate learning and knowledge biases that 
individuals exhibit. For example, bandwagon effect or herd behavior is a cognitive bias in 
humans that people follow what others are doing instead of using their own information or 
making independent decisions, which is commonly observed and can be detrimental to disaster 
evacuations(44). In natural hazards research, researchers have observed that the memory of events 
tends to fade over time (i.e., memory effect), which makes individuals less likely to take 
preparative actions(11,12), and this behavior is critical to capture in the model process. Memory 
fading can be a result of time or of new people moving into the area. In ABMs, the memory 
effect is often modelled as either a decay parameter on the awareness of the hazard(12) or as a 




In this work, we use a Bayesian updating model with a memory effect. This captures agent 
learning even without intervening actions (as in reinforcement learning) and does so in a way 
that is consistent with existing knowledge, particularly of the importance of the memory effect. 
 
2.3.4 Modeling Decisions in an ABM 
 
The decision-making component of an ABM is a critical element for modeling emergent 
behavior. There are many different types of decision rules that can be used within ABMs. For 
ABMs in the hazards field specifically, we divide behavioral decision models into four groups: 
‘if-then’, descriptive, empirical, and prescriptive.  
The first approach is “if-then” models which take the format of “if this happens, then one 
will do that with some likelihood.” This approach is more ad-hoc and often hard to be validated, 
though it is widely used in the ABM literature. The probabilities can be populated based on 
observation (i.e., empirical) or based on subject matter experts, but that is typically not the point. 
The objective is to find the marginal influence of different types of decisions on model 
outcomes, and these types of models require extensive sensitivity analysis(11,37,42). 
Descriptive decision theory attempts to explain the actual behaviors of decision-makers. This 
is often different from their utility optimizing actions. Prospect theory is one example of a 
descriptive framework.  Here, individuals evaluate outcomes based on possible gains and losses 
rather than expected utility(45). Another well-known collection of descriptive decision theory 
method is bounded rationality. Models for bounded rationality assume individuals would be 




have, their cognitive limitations, and/or the amount of time they have to make the decision(46). 
Various heuristics and biases have also been studied to help explain observed actions. An 
examples of using these methods in the ABM literature is a model of water scarcity management 
for repeated droughts.(47)  
Empirical models apply observed decision behavior (e.g., observed mitigation rates). The 
approach is reasonable when building an ABM for a particular region using observed data from 
that same region provided that the behavior is unlikely to change in the future. Then with a well-
established dataset, statistical approaches can be applied to model agent’s behaviors. However, 
individuals from different regions have been observed making different choices under similar 
hazards(48) – likely because of different background understanding of the hazard – meaning 
empirical data are at times less relevant when applied to different regions. These methods are 
also less useful for situations in which agents must make decisions in environments they have 
not seen before. 
Prescriptive decision theory models focus on identifying the “best” decisions by using 
expected utility maximization. This model assumes that a rational decision-maker lists the 
actions or alternatives available to him or her, identifies the possible outcomes associated with 
each action along with the likelihood of occurrence of these outcomes, and finally quantifies the 
desirability of each outcome using a utility function. The alternative with the highest expected 
utility is selected. While attractive for improving individual decision-making, utility theory is not 
necessarily a descriptive approach that captures the actual decision process people use(49). 
In this chapter we use a utility-based model with subjective information for agent decision-




with long-term changes to their homes, the agents are likely to consider costs and benefits in 
depth, analyzing their options. 
 
2.3.5 Climate change and hurricanes(50) 
 
Climate change is likely to alter the pattern of hurricane occurrence in the next century(51). 
While there is uncertainty in how climate change will affect hurricane frequency and intensity, it 
is likely that hurricanes will become less frequent though more intense in the Atlantic basin(52). 
On the other hand, climate change will also cause sea level rise, which will inundate coastal 
regions and result in flooding of areas that might have never seen storm surge in the past. In 
addition, greenhouse gas-induced warming may lead to gradually increasing risk of the 
occurrence of highly destructive category-5 storms(53). We use a scenario-driven approach, 
similar to Staid et al., to better understand how individual behavior interactions with a changing 
hurricane climate to influence community vulnerability over time(13). 
2.4 Methods 
2.4.1 Overview of Model structure 
 
Our approach builds on the agent-based model in Reilly et al. by integrating computational 
learning and decision-making models and synthetic stochastic hurricane models(27). The addition 
of synthetic hurricane, as opposed to the use of historical hurricanes, allows for us to test the 
implications of different possible future climate scenarios. Our agents are individual 




hurricane wind hazard. The model is initialized by assigning each agent attributes of their house 
(i.e., their house’s construction type, a.k.a., building class, and the house’s ability to resist wind 
forcing, a.k.a., resistance level) and a wealth (approximated by their house’s improved value). 
The agents make mitigation decisions on an annual basis. Decisions are driven by an agent’s 
perception of the risks from hurricanes. We simulate how the region could evolve over 100-year 
periods in various hurricane scenarios. We choose 100-year as it is a sufficiently long period to 
allow us to see the results of individual behavior in a setting in which events happen relatively 
infrequently. The goal is to find the marginal contribution of decision-making related to 
mitigation on the vulnerability of the regional building stock. It is not to predict the building 
stock or its quality in 100-years. We compare different scenarios and analyze the level of 
vulnerability of the community and discuss the importance of learning and initial knowledge of 
the agents to their decisions. Figure 2-1 provides an overview of the model used in this study. 
We first give an overview of this structure, and the subsections below provide more detail on the 
model’s components. 
 




We create different hurricane climate scenarios by controlling the frequency and intensity of 
synthetic hurricanes used in our analysis. Then we run a number of replications of the entire 100-
year history using a simulation model that can be divided in to four components: the hurricane 
sampling model, the building damage model, the learning model, and the mitigation decision 
model. Many of these components have multiple steps to compute that are described in later 
subsections. The general process is that in a given time step (i.e., year), we sample the number 
and intensity of hurricanes to occur (zero hurricanes is a possibility in a given year) from 
distributions initially parameterized to reflect the conditions of the study area. The hurricane(s) 
that most closely matches the intensities are selected from a large library of synthetic but 
possible storms. This process is described in Section 3.2. Each house is probabilistically assigned 
damage (i.e., a damage level) based on the intensity of the hurricane, where it made landfall, and 
the construction type and resistance level of each home (which together, have their 
vulnerabilities represented by fragility curves). This process is described in Section 3.3. Agents 
then learn from this experience (which could include no hurricanes or no damage even if there is 
a hurricane) and then make mitigation decisions. This process is described in Section 3.4. This 
entire process repeated for 100-years under different climate scenarios. The model purposefully 
excludes numerous confounding factors, including insurance, disaster policy, and relocation, to 
isolate the impacts of learning from disasters for various climate scenarios. Future work could 
explore these effects. 
The number of replications needed for stochastic convergence is determined by replicating 
the entire 100-year time horizon 10,000 times. We use the coefficient of variation shown in 
equation (1) to calculate the output from the ABM. We then use equation (2) to find the 




between the coefficient of variation from n replications and m replications, where m is a large 
number. 𝑐𝑉




         (1) 
𝑛min = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛|𝑐𝑉
𝑛 − 𝑐𝑉
𝑚| < 𝐸, ∀𝑚 > 𝑛       (2) 
2.4.2 Hurricane sampling model 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Hurricane Sampling model 
 
An overview of the hurricane sampling model of the ABM is shown in Figure 2-2. A 
synthetic library of possible hurricanes to affect the region is initially created and is used for all 
simulations (see Appendix A). The library consists of 36,399 plausible storm tracks that could 
affect the study area, ranging from tropical storms to Category-5 hurricanes. With these tracks, 




centroid of each parcel (54). The library itself contains no information on the likelihood of any of 
these synthetic hurricanes over other synthetic hurricanes. Next, baseline hurricane frequency 
and intensity distributions are established for the region. The region’s historic yearly hurricane 
frequency and maximum hurricane windspeed are fitted to Poisson and Weibull distributions, 
respectively, to create baseline distributions. The fitted parameters are later perturbed for 
different climate change scenarios (e.g., the rate parameter for climate scenario with 10% more 
hurricane is multiplied by 1.1). Once the simulation has begun, in each simulated year, we 
sample from the intensity and frequency distributions to identify how many hurricanes affect the 
region that year (0 or more) and how intense each hurricane is. The hurricane in the synthetic 
library that is closest in intensity to the sampled intensity is selected.  A detailed description of 
this model is provided in Appendix A. 
2.4.3 Building damage model 
 
For each hurricane, the 3-second 10-meter peak wind gust (which is typically used in the 
design code for wind resistance in structural engineering)  at the centroid of each parcel is 
computed(54). If more than one hurricane occurs in a year, the hurricane that is most intense is 
used. That is, damage from subsequent storms does not compound. Then, each house is assigned 
a damage state by combining building’s fragility curve with the downscaled windspeed at the 
parcel’s location.  
HAZUS fragility curves are used to model each house’s fragility. Each parcel is assigned to a 
building class based in its characteristics (e.g., number of stories, construction material). Each 
building class has distinct possible resistance levels, depending on the possible ways mitigation 




resistance level has five fragility curves, one for each of the possible damage states. These are: 
Damage State 0, (DS0, no damage), Damage State 1 (DS 1, minor damage or 10% or less of the 
building sustained damage), Damage State 2 (DS2, moderate damage or about 25% of the 
building sustained damage), Damage State 3 (DS3, severe damage or about 50% of the building 
sustained damage), and Damage State 4 (DS4, completely destroyed)(55). We assume every house 
will return to its original state at each simulated year. Fragility curves produce a probability that 
a house of a specific type and resistance level will be in one of five damage states conditioned on 
the wind speed.  
The damage model randomly samples a number between 0 and 1 and a damage state is 
selected in proportion to the likelihood of being in a specific damage state given a wind speed. 
The losses are quantified by multiplying the improved value of the parcel by the fraction of 
sustained damage. Given the simplicity of these fragility curves, criticism exists(27). Our study is 
not dependent on this model and alternate fragility curves can easily be incorporated as long as 
they give similar output(27). 
After a hurricane, we assume that any agents which experienced damages rebuilds. 
Additionally, some or all agents may decide to mitigate. A wood-framed home, which constitutes 
the vast majority of the houses in our study area, could be upgraded by installing roof-wall 
straps, application of secondary water resistance, installing storm shutters, strengthening the roof 
deck attachment, or by changing the shape of the roof. Part of this decision depends on the cost 
of mitigation. We estimated the cost for individual homeowners to make house upgrading 





2.4.4 Agent Learning and Mitigation Decision Models 
 
Mitigation decisions are essential components of how a community's vulnerability evolves. 
These decisions are partially controlled by an individual’s personal beliefs about the risk a 
hazard poses(57).  By observing a hazard and the damage it causes, or the lack thereof, individuals 
may update their beliefs about the risks posed by the hazard, and potentially change future 
mitigation decisions.  
After each hurricane season in a simulated year, agents learn from their experience and may 
take mitigatory action. For instance, they may believe that the likelihood of a hurricane in any 
given year is now greater especially if they recently experienced a hurricane. These beliefs are 
combined with damage probabilities for each of the mitigation strategies and are used as inputs 
for a decision model on whether to mitigate. 
The ABM is initialized by assigning each agent partial information or “knowledge” about the 
hazardscape. Specifically, each agent holds an initial belief about the frequency of each category 
of hurricane (including no hurricane). This is updated annually given their experiences. In each 
year of the ABM run, regardless if hurricane or damage occurs, agents “learn” from their 
experience by updating their beliefs about their risk and then decide whether to act. Based on this 
knowledge, agents may choose to mitigate, which, in turn, may change the vulnerability of their 
homes to damage in future hurricanes. 
2.4.4.1 Agent Learning Model 
We model agent learning using a Bayesian updating framework. Learning in this model 




on their parcel in a given year. For example, an agent could believe that there is an 80% 
likelihood of no hurricane occurring in a given year, a 19% likelihood that their parcel 
experiences tropical storm force winds, and a 1% likelihood that a Category 1 or stronger storm 
would occur. If this agent were to experience Category 2 force winds, their beliefs about their 
chances of experiencing a Category 1 storm or greater would likely change.  
We use a categorical distribution to describe each agent’s belief for both hurricane frequency 
and intensity. We define 𝑋 as a categorical random variable, 
𝑋 ~ 𝐶𝑎𝑡(𝑝1, 𝑝2, … 𝑝7),         (3) 
where 𝑝1 through 𝑝7 correspond to the probability of no hurricane, a tropical storm, and 
Category 1-5 hurricanes. While each of these divisions has a wide range of windspeeds, we 
select them because an individual is unlikely to know the exact windspeed they experienced, but 
rather an approximate wind speed such as the intensity of the storm on the Saffir-Simpson scale. 
The Dirichlet distribution is the Categorical distribution’s conjugate prior. 𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼7 are the 
Dirichlet’s support parameters and represent the number of observations for each of the 
windspeed divisions. Thus,  
𝑝1, 𝑝2, … 𝑝7 ~𝐷𝑖𝑟(𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼7)       (4) 
If we treat the categorical distribution parameters as random variables, we can leverage each 
new windspeed observation, 𝑋𝑛𝑒𝑤, to update these parameters using Bayes rule and the Dirichlet 
distribution.  The posterior distribution will still be a Dirichlet distribution with parameter 𝛂′ 
given by, 
𝛼𝑖




where 𝕀 is the indicator function. The posterior predictive distribution for this model is given 
by equation (6). 




, 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,7       (6) 
Before the ABM is run, priors – meaning initial beliefs over the intensity and frequency of 
hurricanes, 𝑝1, … 𝑝7  – need to be assigned for each agent. We iteratively assign different starting 
priors in different ABM runs to test how initial beliefs influence the agents’ decision process and 
the long-term vulnerability of the region.  
We also consider the impact of memory decay in the learning models. Memory decay or 
“memory effects” is a phenomenon that occurs when an individual gives more weight to more 
recent events(58). We model the memory effects using 
𝛼𝑖
′ = 𝛼𝑖 ∗ 𝑑 + 𝕀(𝑋𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑖),        (7) 
where 𝑑 < 1, represents a memory decay. More specifically, 𝑑 < 1 forces less weight on 
prior experiences and more weight on the agent’s experience in that year.  
Finally, we consider the confidence that an agent has in its beliefs when making decisions by 
leveraging the parameters that support the Dirichlet distribution. An individual who has 
significant experience may be more likely to act than an individual who has much less(57). As 
example, consider two agents with different priors: (1,1,0,0,0,0,0) and (100,100,0,0,0,0,0), 
respectively. Although both indicate the agents believe there is a 50% probability of having no 
hurricanes and 50% probability of having a tropical storm in a given year, the underlying 
confidence for these two agents is distinct. If the two agents had priors that were (1,1,0,0,0,0,1) 




more extreme event (i.e., a Category 5 hurricane). In the ABM, we incorporate confidence by 
giving the agents different initial beliefs. For example, in one scenario the agents begin with a 
prior of (1,1,0,0,0,0,0), where in another scenario they will hold priors of (100,100,0,0,0,0,0).  
2.4.4.2 Mitigation Decision Model 
After agents learn, they decide whether and how to act. A detailed mathematical description of our 
decision model is presented in Appendix B. A brief overview follows. The agents choose from the 
following alternatives in each year that the model is run: installing roof-wall straps, installing storm 
shutters, improving the roof deck attachment, installing second level water resistance, changing the shape 
of the roof, or simply doing nothing. Each option corresponds to a specific resistance level. Houses that 
are mitigated have a lower probability of being damaged when they are upgraded which is represented by 
differing fragility curves. However, the degree of improvement and the mitigation costs vary considerably 
based on the intervention. We assume agents know the probability of their house being damaged for each 
category of hurricane and for all housing mitigation options. Future iterations of the work could explore 
relaxing this assumption.  
In each simulated year, we calculate each agent’s expected utility for each mitigation alternative by 
combining the agent’s probability distributions over hurricane frequency and intensity and the likelihood 
of damage for each mitigation option together with the costs of the options and the agent’s utility 
function. An exponential risk averse utility function is used(59). The agent then chooses the alternative that 
maximizes their expected utility. 






Figure 2-3 Map of region. Counties in light gray are used in the study. 
Our case study is based on nine counties in the state of Maryland, U.S. - Anne Arundel, 
Calvert, St. Mary, Dorchester, Talbot, Queen Anne’s, Wicomico, Somerset, and Worcester. 
These counties have coastlines along the Chesapeake Bay or the Atlantic Ocean (Figure 2-3).  
There are 357,120 single-family houses in this region. We exclude multi-family housing as the 
mitigation decision is largely not to be controlled by the residents. This leaves 11 building 
classes based on FEMA’s residential building designations. The most common building class is 
two-story wood-framed single-family houses. Then for each type of building, different 
mitigations, such as installing hurricane straps or change roof shapes, can be invested to improve 
the building’s resistance level. A detailed description of all mitigation strategies can be found in 
Reilly et al(27). Publicly available tax-assessor data are used to spatially-locate each house and to 
assign each house a value. The value (i.e., “improved value” from tax assessor data) combined 
with the building’s fragility and the hurricane windspeed provide an estimate of the loss. Anne 
Arundel County is the most populated and is mostly suburban. Ocean City, in Worcester County, 




Because we do not know either income or wealth at the household level, we use property 
value as a proxy for wealth (capital) to support mitigation decisions. This is an imperfect 
measure. However, those with higher home values are arguably more likely to have access to 
capital for mitigation through loans using their home’s value as collateral.  
The case study area experiences a hurricane every 11 to 13 years on average. Most storms are 
Category 1 strength or below by the time they make impact in the region. The hurricane intensity 
tends to be greatest in the southern-most counties, such as Somerset and Worcester Counties.  
We are not attempting to model this region in all of its detail. That is, we are not trying to 
model all details from these nine counties in order to support specific policy recommendations 
for this location. Rather, we used data from this region to parameterize our model to provide a 
reasonable degree of reality and complexity to gain broader insights on the interactions among 
hazard frequency, damage experience, mitigation, and regional vulnerability over time. 
2.6  Measure of Community Vulnerability 
 
To compare different scenarios, it is helpful to have a measure of the overall vulnerability of 
the region to more simply see the effect of different scenarios. We do this through an additional 
calculation outside of the ABM. That is, we assessed the vulnerability of each household to six 
different intensities of tropical storms in that year and integrated these vulnerabilities into an 
overall vulnerability score for our study region. This score does not feed back to the ABM in any 
way. Instead, this was an extra assessment done only to provide an integrated picture of the 
overall vulnerability of the houses in the community. This section provides the details of how 




In each simulated year, we record the state of each house in terms of its resistance level (i.e., 
its degree of mitigation). Then, separate from the ABM, i.e., not providing any feedback into the 
ongoing ABM, we uniformly applied six different wind speeds (the median wind speed of each 
hurricane category) to each house and calculated the expected damage (in dollar value) for each 
house and for each windspeed. We then summed the expected damage across all of the houses to 
get 𝑑𝑖, the aggregate vulnerability measure for windspeed i. 
Given that there is an upper limit of the achievable resistance of houses to hurricane winds, 
we also calculate the maximum and minimum expected damage, 𝑑𝑖
max and 𝑑𝑖
min, which describe 
the most and the least damage a community could experience under wind speed level 𝑖. The 
maximum expected damage, 𝑑𝑖
max, corresponds to all houses being in the lowest resistance level 
(i.e., no mitigation has been conducted). Similarly, the minimum expected damage, 𝑑𝑖
min, 
corresponds to all houses being in the highest resistance level (i.e., no mitigation has been 









min𝑖∈𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙          (8) 
Equation (8) normalizes the range of vulnerability measure to be between 0 and 1. For 
example, the vulnerability in Year 1 is 1, which assumes that no households have conducted 
mitigation and are in their initial resistance levels. If every household in the system chooses to 
mitigate their house to the fullest extent, the community vulnerability will be 0. This is for the 
purpose of best visualizing the output results but it does not mean houses become invincible 
under such events. The simulation for each replication of the full history always starts with no 




the case study region. We use VI over time as our set of overall community vulnerability 
measures. 
Table 2-1 Community Damages from each wind speed 












𝑑max ($) 1.04 × 106 8.50 × 108 7.96 × 109 2.67 × 1010 4.87 × 1010 5.37 × 1010 
𝑑min ($) 1.43 × 105 4.18 × 108 2.61 × 109 7.76 × 109 1.94 × 1010 3.04 × 1010 
 
2.7  Results 
 
This section presents the results of our analysis. We start with the influence of hurricane frequency 
and intensity given weak priors (i.e., low confidence of their assessment of the hazard). In the second 
subsection, we then vary the intensity of the priors. The priors are varied by iteratively perturbing the 
support parameters of the Dirichlet distribution that reflect each agent’s knowledge and level of 
confidence when each run of the ABM is initialized. This helps us to isolate the influence of individuals 
who learn and gain confidence in their knowledge on regional vulnerability verses those who learn little 
from their experience. Similarly, we iteratively perturb the memory decay parameter to quantify the effect 
that an emphasis on more recent events has in forming beliefs on mitigation decisions.  
2.7.1 Influence of Hurricane Intensity and Frequency 
 
In this section, we first show how community vulnerability evolves in our model under 
different hurricane climate scenarios. We tested multiple intensities and frequencies of 
hurricanes. The intensity and frequency are modeled as 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5, and 1.75 times the 




of (1,1,0,0,0,0,0), which assumes the agents have little knowledge with the environment, and that 
they believe they are equally likely to experience a tropical storm as a Category 1 storm. This is 
later referred to as the “baseline” priors. These priors are unlikely to induce mitigation before an 
agent observes additional hurricanes because an agent holding these beliefs does not believe a 
hurricane with force significant enough to cause substantial damage their house will occur. The 
results of this initial analysis are shown in Figure 2-4. 
 
Figure 2-4 The baseline evolution of community vulnerability over a century under different hurricane scenarios. The 
agents are initialized with a (1,1,0,0,0,0,0) prior. Each solid line represents the mean vulnerability index across all replications 
in each simulation year. Dashed line with the same color with ‘+’ sign are the 85% upper bound of the output samples. Dashed 
line with the same color with ‘-’ sign are the 15% lower bound of the output samples. 
In Figure 2-4, for both plots, the X-axis is the year within simulation, and the Y-axis is the 
vulnerability index (VI). I0.75 means hurricane intensity is 0.75 times the intensity generated 
from the current and baseline climate, and F0.75 means the frequency is 0.75 times the frequency 
in the baseline climate. The orange lines for both plots are the same baseline scenario with 
intensity and frequency matching historical observations. Each line represents the mean 
vulnerability index across all replications in each simulation year.  We see that the community 
vulnerability decreases over time. This occur because we start the agents with no mitigation and 




see that the intensity and frequency of hurricanes also substantially affect how community 
vulnerability evolves. As the intensity or frequency of hurricanes increases, community 
vulnerability to a storm of a given intensity decreases, and the higher the increase in intensity or 
frequency, the greater the reduction in vulnerability. This is because more mitigation takes place 
in response to more realized damage and this mitigation occurs sooner, meaning the benefits 
compound.  
Based on the rate of change over time in the VI, the agents are more responsive to intensity 
changes than frequency changes. That is, for a given level of increase intensity, there is a greater 
reduction in vulnerability than for the same level of change in frequency. Furthermore, for the 
I1.75 scenario, the vulnerability of the region asymptotically approaches the minimum 
vulnerability (most resistant to hurricanes) over time. Hurricanes that are more intense tend to 
stimulate substantially more mitigations and reduce community vulnerability than more frequent 
but mild hurricanes.  
 
2.7.2 Impact of Initial Knowledge on the Evolution of Community Vulnerability 
Under Different Climate Scenarios 
To examine the effect of initial beliefs held by agents on the evolution of community 
vulnerability under different hurricane environments, we tested different sets of initial priors that 
all the agents hold at the beginning of the simulation. Table 2 below shows the priors we use and 
what each prior implies about their beliefs. We compare the results from starting with each prior 
with the results from starting with the baseline priors (provided in Table 2) to examine the effects 




The baseline evolution of vulnerability is shown in Figure 2-4 and is used to compare with 
each different prior scenario under the same climate. As before, we changed the intensity or the 
frequency, but not both together. We also controlled the hurricane records input for each 
hurricane climate scenario (e.g., a certain frequency or intensity comparing to the baseline 
scenario) with common random numbers to reduce the variance and make the results comparable 
for each scenario. That means the area will always be impacted by the same hurricanes over 100 
years in each replication for each initial knowledge priors. The common random number 
approach helps decrease the variance and reduce the number of replications needed for 
convergence when comparing different scenarios(60). Figures 2-5 and 2-6 show the difference 
between the mean VI from the baseline-priors case and the mean VI for a scenario using 
modified priors (but the same intensity-frequency combination). Also shown are the 95% 
confidence intervals that are constructed by bootstrapping of all VI outputs from each replication 
in that scenario. 
Table 2-2 Initial knowledge explanations 





(1,1,0,0,0,0,0) Little knowledge for hurricanes 




(1,1,1,0,0,0,0) Little knowledge for events stronger 




(1,1,1,1,0,0,0) Little knowledge for events stronger 




(1,1,1,1,1,0,0) Little knowledge for events stronger 




(10,10,0,0,0,0,0) Moderately strong belief that there 





(100,100, 0,0,0,0,0) Strong beliefs that there will be no 
events stronger than tropical storm 
 
Wrong Prior  
(Severe Hurricanes) 

























Figure 2-5 Differences in vulnerability for different 
initial priors compared with the baseline initial knowledge 
scenario over 100 years. Hurricane intensity scenario 
changes from 0.75, 1.00, until 1.75 times the baseline 
climate. 
 
Figure 2-6 Differences in vulnerability for different 
initial priors comparing with the baseline initial knowledge 
scenario over 100 years. Hurricane frequency scenario 








The results of the influence of priors under different hurricane intensity scenarios are shown 
in Figure 2-5. The x-axis of each plot is time (years), and the y-axis is the difference between the 
mean VI for the baseline-priors case and the mean VI for a scenario using modified priors. When 
this difference is positive (negative), it means that this case resulted in a more (less) vulnerable 
community than the baseline-priors scenario. This difference can be substantial among different 
initial beliefs and climate scenarios.  
Initial beliefs can influence agents’ behaviors and community vulnerability substantially in 
the early years. For example, we found that under the climate scenario with hurricanes of 
intensity 1.75 times the initial climatic conditions, the largest difference between any two priors 
was more than 0.2, which is a large difference in the outcome when facing a same hurricane. 
When the climate intensity increases from the initial climatic conditions, cases with different 
initial priors begin to converge to a similar vulnerability level given a sufficient amount of time. 
Vulnerability levels initially diverge in earlier years and start to converge after the agents have 
time to be influenced by the environment. That is, we see the effects of learning over time. 
Stronger hurricanes speed up the effect of learning and reduce the effect of initial knowledge 
more quickly. 
Another interesting finding is that holding strong beliefs about intense hurricanes initially 
(i.e., the “wrong priors case”) does not necessarily imply the least vulnerability compared to 
other initial beliefs. The reason is that strong hurricane beliefs make the agents realize that, 




cannot be reduced by much given the mitigation options we modeled. Their investment on house 
upgrades then would not be worth the cost. On the other hand, holding strong beliefs about less 
intense hurricanes (i.e., the “Partially Strong 2 case”) impedes mitigation as well. This is because 
even an additional experience of a strong hurricane makes it difficult for agents to overcome 
their strongly held prior belief that hurricanes in the region are usually not intense. Only when 
the agents hold more neutral beliefs, i.e. Partially Uninformative 3 and 4 cases does the 
community become more hurricane-resistant.  
Different hurricane frequency scenarios have similar rankings for different priors as the 
rankings for different hurricane intensities (Figure 2-6). However, the differences become larger 
when the frequency increases (note that the range on the y-axis differs between scenarios, so that 
we can zoom in and show differentiation among some results). The reason is that when more 
hurricanes strike the area, regions that are less likely to be impacted will be influenced at some 
point, and the agents will be more likely to mitigate, as in their perceived risk, the chance of no 
hurricane happening drops significantly. This reflects on each initial belief scenario and enlarge 
the gap when comparing high frequency and low frequency scenarios. In the frequency cases, 
initial knowledge held by the agents takes a bigger role in determining the patterns the evolution 
of vulnerability over time relative to the cases in which intensity was varied. The initial 
differences in beliefs create divergence in community vulnerability that does not converge by 
year 100. Therefore, the initial knowledge the agents remain important in the long run with 






2.7.3 Impact of Memory Effects on the Evolution of Community Vulnerability 
Under Different Climate Scenarios 
 
Finally, we model the memory effects of agents as a decaying weight on their past experiences as 
discussed above. We chose the memory decay ratios to be 1 (no decay), 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6. Such a 
process can be regarded as a result of memory fading and generation replacement. This process limits the 
agents to make decisions based on partial information from recent events instead of using a more 
complete record of events. As a result, we find that this memory process always promotes more 
mitigation and less vulnerability for any climate scenario. An example of this is shown in Figure 2-7. The 
results for other frequency and intensity scenarios are highly similar and are omitted for brevity. The blue 
line in both plots are corresponding to the green lines in Figure 2-4. We are using the same partially 
uninformative prior as the baseline scenario. 
 
Figure 2-7 The evolution of community vulnerability under 1.25 intensity scenario (left) and 1.25 frequency scenario (right) with 
different memory decaying parameter. Each solid line represents a different memory decay parameter. Dashed line with the same 
color with ‘+’ sign are the 85% upper bound of the output samples. Dashed line with the same color with ‘-’ sign are the 15% 
lower bound of the output samples. 
We see in Figure 2-7 that the faster the agents’ past memory decays, the more mitigation that 
occurs and less vulnerable the community is. The explanation for this phenomenon is that most 




decay, this experience of no hurricanes has a reduced impact in their updating. Then, when 
hurricane damage does occur, their beliefs change far more than if there was no memory decay. 
This in turn dramatically increases their perceived risk of hurricane damage, increasing the 
appeal of mitigation actions. That is, with the memory effect, agents are much more sensitive to 
recent hurricanes. This emphasizes the importance of better understanding the degree to which 
limited memory is a factor in learning from the effects of past hazards. 
 
2.8  Conclusions 
In this chapter, we analyzed the importance of individual learning, initial knowledge, and the effect of 
the strength of memory on the evolution of community vulnerability under different climate scenarios 
using an ABM. We found that incorporating the effect of learning is critical when simulating how 
community vulnerability may evolve under different adaptation and climate scenarios. In our model, more 
intense and frequent hurricane scenarios stimulated more mitigation and resulted in a less vulnerable 
community overall. Different initial knowledge held by the agents had an important role in determining 
the region’s vulnerability, especially in early years. Limited memory can induce more mitigation because 
agents are more sensitive to recent experiences. A better understanding of the learning process of 
individual homeowners will lead to a better understanding of their behaviors, which will benefit decision-
makers and policy-makers in long-term community vulnerability mitigation decisions. For example, when 
a community is anchored in their beliefs of few storms (i.e., partially strong priors – the blue line) they are 
more vulnerable. Getting people to realize that their prior beliefs are wrong – admittedly a challenging 
task – may be useful in reducing VI. On the other hand, as people are more likely to make mitigation 
decisions right after hurricanes, it can be more effective for government to provide subsidies on 




More generally, the results in this chapter highlight the importance of understanding and modeling 
learning at an individual level when conducting a vulnerability assessment or risk analysis for a 
community facing the potential for repeated hazard events. Individual actions can substantially alter 
community vulnerability and learning from events is a critical part of this. Ignoring this learning effect 
can lead to substantial mis-estimation of future risk.  
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Repeated heat waves impact vulnerable populations such as the elderly and lower income 
groups that are less able to respond to high heat events. The vulnerability of these and other 
groups to heat waves changes over time in response to social connections, collective action, 
utility coordination, and government policies. This chapter presents the results of an agent-based 
modeling framework that integrates a heatwave model, dynamically evolving agents, social 
connections, and a health mortality model to study the impact of repeated heatwaves on society. 
We use a case study based on Baltimore, MD, USA to examine the regional dynamics and the 
evolution of regional vulnerability in the face of repeated heatwave hazards in a realistic setting. 
We find that a change of climate can influence the long-term vulnerability of a community in 
surprising ways. If daily average temperatures increase, it can stimulate more individual 
mitigation behaviors and reduce the number of people that die from future heat waves. Social 
networks can also have a substantial impact in helping decrease mortality by providing options 
for cooling at friends’ houses. On the other hand, cooling centers can be used effectively in 
helping decrease mortality for a given event, but they may also increase the long-term 
vulnerability by decreasing people’s motivation to adopt mitigation, which increases the risks 








Extreme heat events can cause severe consequences to the economy, infrastructure, and 
human lives. In 1995, a deadly five-day long heatwave struck Chicago causing 739 heat-related 
deaths. Many factors aggravated the catastrophe such as the lack of emergency response 
planning, an aging population, poverty, and power outages (1). The majority of deaths occurred 
among older people who were socially isolated (2). In 2020, multiple high temperature events in 
California aggravate wildfires that burned millions of acres, put pressure on power system, and 
created an unpleasant and unhealthy work-from-home environment coupled with Covid-19. Heat 
waves have become a hazardous event we cannot neglect in this century. 
One of the most effective mitigation measures to prepare for heat waves is to invest an air 
conditioning (A/C). However, this option is not available to all individuals, especially lower-
income people. Furthermore having air conditioning does not necessarily mean the owner can 
afford the power to operate it (3). Both power outages and utility demand management programs 
can also block A/C functionality and cause extensive and unexpected exposure to prolonged 
heat. On the other hand, the government can open cooling centers and extend public pool hours 
during extreme heat to help mitigate the impacts. While there are studies discussing the 
vulnerability of communities facing heat waves, most are (1) focused on a single hazard event, 
i.e., the 1995 Chicago heat wave or the 2003 Europe heat wave (e.g., Changnon et al. 1996; De 
Bono et al. 2004) and (2) ignore the dynamics of social networks and individual behaviors that 




individuals, communities, and infrastructures is obscure and there is a lack of quantitative studies 
that examine how adaptive behavior may change vulnerability to future events. This introduces 
difficulty for individual and government decision makers as they seek to make better preparation 
for future heat wave events, especially in regions where the climate is shifting towards higher 
temperatures. 
There have been numerous studies of single heat wave events in terms of their impacts, 
outcomes, and mitigation actions. As an example, in response to the extreme heat wave that 
happened in Chicago in 1995, there have been studies discussing the cause and relationship to 
climate (5), the possibility of recurrence (6), the importance of social connections to individual 
vulnerability (2), and the preparation and response to the event (7). These studies diagnosed the 
event in depth from a specific perspective and potentially helped decrease the vulnerability of 
Chicago region when facing heat waves again. However, the vulnerability changes induced by 
individual behaviors and local climate, which are both dynamic, are hard to capture from studies 
of a single event.  
To understand the long-term vulnerability of a community facing heat waves, we need to 
consider three major mitigation sources. The first one is individual mitigation decisions. The 
most effective action one can take is to invest in A/C units (8). However, the reasons for and 
timing of A/C purchases have not been well-studied. Another mitigation source that is non-
neglectable during heat waves is the impact of social capital and social networks. Social capital 
is an important factor in disaster response, but its mechanism and influence remain unclear (9). It 
remains unclear in which circumstances social capital may decrease vulnerability. Previous 
studies indicate associations between social capital and aggregate health (9–11). Some studies, 




study, we focus on a subset of social capital and explore how social networks may influence 
health risks under repeated heat waves.  
Lastly, government response efforts can be crucial in helping mitigation. The government 
can open cooling centers and extend public building hours to decrease heat exposure. However, 
Naughton et al. suggest that cooling centers were not used effectively during the heat wave in 
Chicago 1999 and needed better explanation to the residents (14). 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the compound effects of individual mitigation 
decisions, social networks, climate change, and power outages on the evolution of community 
vulnerability and heat-related mortality under repeated heat waves. This work also provides a 
framework for studying the impact of government policies, market incentives, and power 
demand reduction programs in combating heat wave losses.  
Our analysis is based on an agent-based model (ABM) which incorporates a heat wave 
model, individual learning and mitigation models, a social network model, and a heat wave 
mortality model. In the model, each individual has social connections and makes mitigation 
decisions (e.g., invest an A/C) with their household members. The approach is place-based, with 
a case study area based on 594,077 residents in Baltimore city, Maryland. However, both the 
models and results are generalizable to other areas with similar data inputs. 
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. We first review relevant studies 
from two different areas: (1) heat waves and their health impacts, and (2) agent-based modeling 
of community vulnerability. Next we describe the model used in this study and discuss its 




change the evolution of community health risk from heat waves in our study region. We close 
with concluding thoughts and suggestions for future research. 
 
3.3 Literature review 
3.3.1 Heat wave vulnerability and mitigation 
In many years, heat waves are the nation’s most lethal form of extreme weather (15). Repeated 
heatwaves, defined as heatwaves repeatedly happening in the same geographic region, have the 
potential to change hazard response behavior of residents, affect long-term investments in heat 
wave preparation, and alter emergency response policy. Repeated events potentially lead to 
profound effects on the vulnerability of a region. Repeated exposure to these extreme weather 
conditions could be harmful to individual health (16). However, studies of the impacts of repeated 
hazards, especially heat waves, are limited. Previous studies on repeated impacts focus on 
discipline-specific prospective on the problem rather than addressing the problem in an 
integrated, interdisciplinary way (16).  
Heat waves can cause substantial public health impacts within the communities they hit. 
Very extreme heat waves, while rare, can cause substantial increases in mortality(17). Examples 
include a July 1995 heat wave in Chicago, associated with nearly 800 excess deaths and with 
significant increases in heat related illness straining limited public health and hospital 
resources(18,19). Others include the 2003 heat wave in France and the 2010 heat wave in Russia, 
estimated to have been associated with 15,000 and 55,000 excess deaths, respectively (20). 
Slightly less severe, but more frequent, heat waves, though associated with lower overall risk of 




Heat waves can affect certain subpopulations more than others, and the elderly have 
consistently been identified as a higher risk group for these effects. For example, in a systematic 
review including 61 studies on heat wave vulnerability and mortality, Benmarhnia et al. found 
significantly increased risk in older age groups(21). Elderly populations continue to be included as 
an at-risk population in heat action plans around the world(22). 
However, studies have suggested various public health interventions including increasing 
access to air-conditioned shelters (23,24) and increased social contact during extreme heat 
events(24) as protective during heat wave events. Of these protective factors, having a home air 
conditioning unit has consistently been identified as the single most protective factor during 
extreme heat events(14,18,24–27). 
 
3.3.2 Agent-based model (ABM) of community vulnerability 
An ABM is a bottom-up approach used to simulate a complex system where heterogeneous 
agents can make decisions and interact with each other and the environment dynamically (28,29). 
The primary benefit of an ABM framework is that it allows researchers to create a 
comprehensive collection of scenarios to conduct sensitivity analysis which facilitates answering 
what-if questions under different circumstances (30). Compared to top-down approaches, another 
benefit of an ABM is its revelation of compounding effects and interactions (31).  However, 
results from an ABM could be challenging to validate and verify due to untraceable human 
behaviors and unprecedented scenarios (30). Output analysis can also be complex, because ABM 
output is often high-dimensional and requires sophisticated analytical approaches (32). Despite 
these challenges, an ABM can be a useful tool to promote understanding of how a complex 




ABMs have seen increasing use in modeling natural disaster-related issues in recent years. 
Most work has centered on analyzing short-term actions after the hazard happens to demonstrate 
how agents would evacuate, take shelter, or access primary care services and discuss the 
potential flaws and improvements (33–35). On the other hand, ABMs have more recently been used 
to model long-term effects caused by natural disasters (31,36,37). For example, Reilly et al. focuses 
on repeated hurricane events and shows that individual mitigation actions (purchasing 
generators) can lead to less system-level investment in system hardening, leaving those less able 
to afford individual action worse off(37).  
The composition of an ABM in longer-term vulnerability studies of natural disasters takes 
five basic components: a definition of agents, an environment model, a learning or risk 
perception model, a behavioral model, and an interaction model. We briefly review how each 
component is modeled in the literature. Agents are heterogeneous units that can make decisions 
autonomously (38). Agents can be parcels (39), single homeowners (31), or any other decision 
making unit. The agents can learn from the environment to update their perception of the risks of 
the hazard (36,37). The process can be viewed as a learning process with new information acquired 
by the agents(31,36). The agents then make mitigation decisions based on their assessment of the 
risk and their characteristics, typically including their wealth as a constraint. There are three 
main classes of decision-making models (1) prescriptive, (2) descriptive, and (3) expert or data 
based if-then models. A detailed review of these models can be found in Chengwei et al. 2020. 
Among these models, an if-then model is particularly flexible and can be incorporated if properly 
tuned (36,37).  
There are generally two types of agent interactions that must be modeled in a hazard-focused 




each other. One of the key agent-environment interactions in a hazard-focused ABM is how the 
agents experience the hazard, the damage they experience, the information they receive about 
that damage, and related issues. Generally, agent actions can modify these impacts through, for 
example, pre-event mitigation or post-event response. The second key interaction is of the agents 
with each other, though this is also a key to non-hazard ABMs (40–42). 
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Overview and model assumptions 
We model the impacts of repeated heatwaves on residents in a city based on but not identical 
to Baltimore, MD in the U.S. This helps ground the model in reality. Our agents are individuals 
in the city, each living in an assigned household. We simulate how the vulnerability of the 
region, defined more precisely below, may evolve under repeated heatwaves and how individuals 
make decisions to mitigate heatwaves over time. The agents living in the same household make 
annual mitigation decisions. These decisions are driven by the perception of heatwave risk and 
have the potential to reduce the household’s future exposure to extreme heat. We focus on the 
purchase of air conditioning as the household-level mitigation decision as this is a main way to 
mitigate the effects heatwaves at the level of an individual house. Agents also may have access 
to cooling by being invited to the home of someone in their social network who has air 
conditioning, and we model this process probabilistically. Air conditioning thus serves as a 
modifier of risk both for an individual household and by influencing the likelihood that they have 
access to air conditioning in their social network. 
In this chapter we build from the general framework for agent-based modeling of repeated 




(1) agents, (2) environment, (3) adaptation, (4) behaviors, and (5) interactions. Our model is 
based on Baltimore City. That is, we model each notional household in Baltimore, assigning 
each synthetic household a set of agents with ages such that (1) the distribution of agent ages 
matches that of the census tract and (2) the age structure of households is reasonable (e.g., all 
minors must have at least one adult in the same household). We then develop a synthetic social 
network for each agent, with details provided below. 
We model the heatwave environment based on the historical weather data for Baltimore and 
apply daily temperature uniformly to each agent. That is, we do not explicitly model within-day 
spatial temperature variability because this data was not available historically, though we 
acknowledge that this variability can be important (43).  
We also model power outage events, which can prevent those homeowners that have air 
conditioning from being able to use it. In the simulation, power outages happen as rare events to 
account for the reality that during hot weather power outages can occur as a result of overloading 
and heat-induced equipment failures. We model how agents learn from heat wave events and 
how they make mitigation decisions. Finally, we estimate mortality in the community as a result 
of exposure to high temperatures given each heat wave, corrected for air conditioning. 
The flowchart of the simulation is shown in Figure 3-1. We start with initializing parameters 
and agents. The simulation model then enters an annual loop for each replication. For each year, 
we first determine if there is a heat wave in the given year. If there is a heat wave, then for each 
heat wave we first determine if there is a power outage and who will lose power. If there is no 




If there is a heatwave in a given year, the model first determines if each agent will be 
exposed to the heat and, if so, how many days each of them will be exposed. An agent will be 
exposed to a day of heat wave if the household does not own an air conditioning, if they do not 
get invited by to the home of someone in their social network that has air conditioning, and they 
do not get a spot in the cooling center, an occurrence that is modeled stochastically. Next, we 
determine the number of deaths from the heat wave based on the exposure of individuals. At the 
end of each simulated year agent household decide if they want to purchase air conditioning 
based on a decision model described below. Later in this section, we will explain each of these 
portions of the model in detail. 
Throughout this chapter, it is important to keep in mind that we are not trying to model the 
actual development or functionality of a particular city or its demographic evolution. We created 
a simplified version of the real Baltimore by only including elements that are most essential to 
answer our proposed research question regarding the vulnerability of community under 
heatwaves and the impact of social interactions. This allows us to keep the model grounded in a 





Figure 3-1 Simulation framework of the Agent Based model 
There are three key areas in which we make assumptions – demographic changes, heat wave 
definition, and individual decision making. The first area in which we make simplifying 
assumptions is that the demographics and social networks remain unchanged over the 30 years in 
each simulation run. This means that there is no aging, births, deaths, immigration or emigration. 
However, as the A/C decision made at each house is inherited within each simulation, the 
primary assumption is that the distribution of each age group remains the same over the 
simulation period. This allows us to focus on the effects of social networks and individual 
mitigation decisions, holding demographics, which are difficult to forecast, constant.  
The second area in which we make an assumption is in the definition of a heat wave. 
Defining a heat wave is a known research challenge (44). In our study, we define a heatwave as 
two or more consecutive days when the average temperature is higher than the 97th quantile of 
historical temperature of a city as it gives us a sufficient number of events while still having each 




We use Baltimore city, Maryland as the study region to collect input data for our simulation. 
In 2016, the population of Baltimore city was 616,958 and the number of single-family 
households was approximately 250,000. In our study, one of the most important population 
groups is those who are 65 and above because they are more at risk from heat events. The 
proportion of the Baltimore population over 65 years old has remained stable, varying from 
13.7% in 19902 to 13.2% in 20103, which is also a justification of our simplification of the 
agent’s aging model. The mortality model that we use accounts for resident age. A summary of 
the high temperature events we found for Baltimore city is shown in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1 Summary of High Temperature Events in Baltimore from 1987 to 2017 
Number of High Temperature Events Average Length (days) 
Average 
mean temperature 
60 4.41 85.0 F 
 
The last area in which we make assumptions is in the area of how individuals make 
decisions. We assume that a household will decide to buy an air conditioner while considering 
the wealth of each individual in the family, their experiences from heat waves, and a majority 











We define the agents in our model to be each resident living in the city. Each agent in our 
model is assigned a home location, age, gender, race, education level, and income, each 
randomly generated based on tax assessor information and census data.  The data generation 
scheme is illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
 
Figure 3-2 Overview of agent characteristic generation process 
 
We start by sampling the type of family living in each home where family type includes the 
size of the family and the combination of family members living in the home (e.g., single-
member family, family with kids, single mom with kids). From the size of each family, we then 
sample the age and gender for each family member based on the distributions of age and gender 
in the census tract. Given the spatial location of houses, we then sample the race of each agent 
based on census tract information. Education levels (high school degree, bachelor’s degree, and 
master’s degree and higher) of the household residents are then sampled based on census data. 
Finally, the income for each individual is sampled based on their gender, education, and race 
from the census distribution. The importance of generating these attributes is that people who 




model. Moreover, people with similar backgrounds tend to make similar decisions, which are 
influential to the vulnerability of them as a group, and such similarity can lead to very different 
heatwave experiences.  
 
3.4.3 Social Network Model 
To generate a social network, we used Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM), where 
the probability of the existence of a connection between a pair of vertices is assumed to depend 
only on the states of the network (45). We use 𝑌𝑖𝑗 to represent the state of the dyadic connection of 
two individuals 𝑖 and 𝑗, where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 1 if there is a connection between these two persons and 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise. Individuals in the same household are assumed to be all connected with each 
other. 
In an ERGM the probability that two vertices are connected is a function of the network 
structure and nodal attributes (46). We let 𝑋 be the set of nodal attributes (e.g., age, sex, wealth) 
for each vertex in the network. In ERGM, the relationship between a graph realization 𝑦 and a 
data set 𝑋 is modeled as:  




           (1) 
where 𝑠(𝑋, 𝑦) is a user-defined function that depends on the observed network and nodal 
attributes, 𝜃 is a vector of model parameters associated with 𝑠(𝑋, 𝑦) and 𝑐 is a normalizing 
constant such that the sum of all probabilities is 1. Then we use this probability as the parameter 
of a Bernoulli distribution to sample if two agents are connected. 
Due to the large number of agents, the calculation of the probability of all pairs of agents is 




on their spatial distribution (Figure 3-3). Although an agent can have more distant social 
connections, we assume that during a heat waves the agent will be more likely to seek help from 
friends who live nearby. We set the number of clusters of each social network group to be 60, 
which means each cluster has an average 10,000 agents as this gives a relatively fast generation 
speed. Within each cluster, we then used the ERGM network generation algorithm to estimate 
the probabilities of each agent being connected with each other agent in that cluster and used 
these probabilities to sample the social networks. 
 
Figure 3-3 Generate social network 
 
3.4.4 Learning model 
We use a Bayesian updating model to represent the learning process of each agent in a 
manner similar to Reilly et al. (2017) . We use the number of unmitigated heat wave days that an 
agent is exposed to as the key variable they have beliefs about and learn about. We assume the 




𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆) and we use a 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(𝛼, 𝛽) prior on 𝜆.  Let 𝑋𝑛𝑒𝑤 be the number of heat wave days 
an agent experienced without air conditioning (their own or at a social connection’s house) in a 
given year. Then we can estimate the posterior mean as ?̂?𝑛𝑒𝑤 =  
𝛼𝑜𝑙𝑑+𝑋𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝛽𝑜𝑙𝑑+1
, where 𝛼𝑜𝑙𝑑 and 
𝛽𝑜𝑙𝑑represent the agent’s beliefs prior to the given year. This approach provides an efficient 
approach for updating agent beliefs about the distribution of the number of heat wave days they 
will experience in a given year. 
3.4.5 Behavioral model 
The key decision modeled in our ABM is the agent-level decision of whether or not to 
purchase air conditioning for their home. We model this as a household-level decision 
considering the wealth of the household. However, there are no existing studies that we are 
aware of that explain how households make this purchasing decision. Our assumption is that the 
purchase decision is related to (1) past heat wave experiences, (2) financial status of the family, 
and (3) the opinion of each adult family member. We use an if/then model for air conditional 
adoption, calibrated to historical air conditioning coverage for our study region with American 
Housing Survey4. This model is summarized in Figure 3-4 and described in detail below. 
 






In our model, the decision of whether or not to buy air conditioning is made at the household 
level, and we assume that this decision is made based on a vote of the adult agents in the 
household. An agent in a household becomes a potential buyer when their perception of 
heatwave length and temperature pass a threshold. Only potential buyers can vote yes. The 




      (2) 
where pvote is the probability the agent will vote to purchase, 𝐼 is the income of the agent, and 𝑚 
is a parameter that we call the motivation parameter. We tune M to calibrate the model with 
historical records. 𝐼𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 is the median income of the region. The wealthier the agent is, the 
more likely they will want to buy air conditioning. Next, we sample in each household using the 
probability each agent will vote YES to decide if the household will buy air conditioning given 
the majority votes. 
3.4.6 Social Invitation Model 
For agents who do not have air conditioning in their houses, they can be invited by their 
friends who do have air conditioning, and this serves to reduce their exposure to high heat. The 
interaction between households within a social network then is a critical aspect of the risk that 
agents face. The model for creating the social networks was described above. Here we describe 
our model for agent interactions within their network.  
The likelihood of an agent being invited to the house of someone who has air conditioning is 
𝑤𝑁𝐴/𝐶/𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙, where 𝑁𝐴/𝐶 is the number of friends with air conditioning and 𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the total 




agents. To be noted, the total number of days an agent can be invited cannot exceed the 
maximum number of friends in their network.  
 
3.4.7 Government mitigation aids (Cooling Center) 
 
Cooling centers are one of the most effective government measures to mitigate heat wave 
risk (47). In the ABM, the use of cooling centers is one of the scenarios we test to examine the 
impact on individual behavior. We do this through a simplified, exogenously-imposed cooling 
center model. For each heat wave day, we assume a fixed number of spaces 𝑁𝑐 every day that are 
open to the public from the cooling center, and cooling center will always have power. We then 
randomly select agents who do not own air conditioning and do not get invited to someone else’s 
house to go to the cooling center. While cooling centers can effectively reduce the number of 
residents exposed to heat waves in short term, they may decrease the motivation to buy air 
conditioning, which in long term could have an impact to the vulnerability of society.  
 
3.4.8 Power outage model 
Power outages during heatwaves can be fatal. Losing power means that the primary 
individual mitigation, air conditioning, is no longer helpful. During heat events, power outages 
can happen from equipment failures due to high temperatures or because of power system 
overloads from increased demand due to air conditioner operation. There is thus a potential 




power outages during heatwaves from two different spatial levels: (1) distribution transformer 
level and (2) distribution substation level.  
A transformer outage occurs when a local distribution system transformer is either 
overheated or overloaded, and such an event leads to loss of power to a relatively small number 
of customers in a localized area. Based on a previous project with a large utility that wishes to 
remain anonymous, we estimated that the likelihood of any one transformer failing due to 
prolonged high temperatures of 100 F is approximately 1x10-5. However, this value is not 
critical, and sensitivity analysis can be used to examine its impact. We assume 10-15 houses are 
served by each distribution transformer, a typical value in many urban power systems. 
Larger scale power outages can be triggered by the failure of distribution substations. They 
may loose functionality due to the high demand from households or due to protective actions to 
preserve power system stability. Such events have happened in the past, and when they do large 
numbers of customers lose power. However, there is limited data on the frequency with which 
such outages occur as a function of temperature, and modeling this type of failure 
mechanistically would require a full AC power flow model for the region. This beyond the scope 
of this study. Instead, we assume a probability of failure for each substation and then conduct 
sensitivity analysis to examine the influence of this assumption. 
3.4.9 Health Mortality model 
In the ABM, we included heat-related excess mortality through a model that estimates the 
number of deaths among the model agents during each heatwave based on characteristics of the 
agent (age and access to air conditioning) and of the heatwave (duration and intensity). This is a 




We developed the heat wave mortality model using data from 83 U.S. communities between 
1987 and 2005. We next used these estimates of heatwave-specific health effects, in conjunction 
with characteristics of each heatwave including its length and intensity, to build predictive 
models of the health effects of a specific heatwave based on its characteristics. Next, we adjusted 
the predicted effects based on each agent’s access to air conditioning during the heatwave (as 
modeled by other components of the ABM), based on results from previous research and 
estimates from the US Census’s American Housing Survey of baseline prevalence of A/C in 
Baltimore. The heat-mortality module of the ABM uses these predicted health risks to generate 
predictions of risk during the heatwave for each agent and use these to estimate numbers of heat-
related deaths among the agents using a standard health impact assessment approach, applying 
the predicted relative risk of mortality associated with each heatwave to underlying baseline 
mortality rates in Baltimore. A detailed description of this model can be found in Appendix C. 
 
3.5 Methodology 
3.5.1 Baseline Scenario and heatwave characteristics 
We test our model in our case study area to simulate how the agents evolve from 1988 to 
2017, a total of 30 years in multiple scenarios. This section defines the baseline scenario which is 
used for comparison with other scenarios. We ran the model for 100 iterations for each scenario 
as this provides an acceptable level of convergence for the total mortality and A/C coverage ratio 
over time. We use estimates the number of iterations needed for convergence based on the 
approach shown in equations (1) and (2). First, we calculated the coefficient of variation shown 
in equation (2) for the simulation output measure. We then use equation (1) to estimate the 










         (2) 
The Baseline scenario is calibrated with the historical A/C adoption percentage for the area 
by tuning the purchase motivation parameter 𝑀 of all households to invest in A/C units. Based 
on the American Housing Survey for metropolitan Baltimore, the coverage ratio for housing 
units with central AC or one room A/C unit are used for calibration in our model. We exclude 
houses with multiple room units as we are most interested in the trend of investing AC while 
preserving the space for the region to evolve. In the left plot of Figure 3-5, we show the 
estimated mortality during each high-temperature event given our definition from table 1 for the 
resulting base-case model. We found that for most high temperature events mortality is fairly 
low, consistent with historic events. However, for some extreme heat waves where the mortality 
is significant, the risk may decrease through mitigation efforts. The right plot of figure 5  shows 
the baseline AC coverage growth over time and the AHS data we use to calibrate the model. 
Defining the baseline scenario enables us to test the sensitivity of the output to different 
parameters and discuss the interplay among individual behaviors, social networks, power 





Figure 3-5 Baseline heat-related mortality and AC penetration. The box plot is showing the 5% and 95% quantile of the 
output samples. 
 
3.5.2 Impacts of Different Heat Wave Environments 
 
Climate change is generally predicted to lead more frequent and intense heat wave events(48). 
These changes in heat wave intensity may interact with individual mitigation measures to change 
heat wave risk in ways that we may not anticipate. We used two different temperature scenarios 
to investigate the potential of this interaction. We assume the historical temperature becomes 
different for our study region. One scenario with 3 ℉warmer and one with 1 ℉ lower for all year 
temperature. These two scenarios can be interpreted as either different locations in the US, or 
different climate in the future. In Figure 3-6, we compare the total mortality due to heat waves 





Figure 3-6 Impacts of different heat wave environment 
 
The results of this comparison are perhaps surprising. As we can see, compared to the 
baseline scenario, the increased temperature case has lower heat wave mortality and the 
decreased temperature case has higher heat wave mortality. The underlying reason is that when 
we increase or decrease the temperature, it changes the heat wave experiences of the agents, 
which in turn changes their air conditioning purchasing decisions. When heat waves are frequent 
and more people are exposed to higher temperatures, individual mitigation choice will take place 
and result in more houses investing in air conditioning. On the other hand when the temperature 
is slightly lower, the agents have less incentive to purchase air conditioning which, in the long 
term, resulting in more casualties during heat waves that are a bit less strong but still detrimental 
to at-risk populations without air conditioning.  
3.5.3 Impacts of Mitigation 
We test the effect of three types of mitigations: (1) individual mitigation decisions, (2) access 
to air conditioning via an agent’s social network, and (3) government interventions in the form of 




strength of each mitigation. The parameters of each case are shown in Table 2. Parameters in 
bold mean they are perturbed compared to the baseline scenario. In Figure 3-7, we compare the 
total number of lives saved during heat waves from mitigations and the A/C coverage evolution 
for these scenarios. Lives saved from mitigation is calculated by comparing with the Total 
Estimated Mortality w/o mitigation, where it assumes every agent is being exposed for all heat 
waves.  
Table 3-2 Definition of Mitigation Scenarios.  
M is purchase motivation, w is invitation willingness, and 𝑁𝐶 is total cooling center capacity. Parameters in bold are what 
changed in each scenario comparing to baseline 
Scenario ID Scenario Name Parameters 
1 Baseline 𝑀 = 3, 𝑤 = 1, 𝑁𝐶 = 0 
2 High Social Invitation 𝑀 = 3, 𝒘 = 𝟏. 𝟑, 𝑁𝐶 = 0 
3 Low Social Invitation 𝑀 = 3, 𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟓, 𝑁𝐶 = 0 
4 No Social Invitation 𝑀 = 3, 𝒘 = 𝟎, 𝑁𝐶 = 0 
5 Low capacity Cooling Center 𝑀 = 3, 𝑤 = 1, 𝑵𝑪 = 𝟑𝟎𝟎𝟎 
6 Medium Capacity Cooling 
Center 
𝑀 = 3, 𝑤 = 1, 𝑵𝑪 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 
7 High Capacity Cooling Center 𝑀 = 3, 𝑤 = 1, 𝑵𝑪 = 𝟑𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 
8 Higher Purchase Motivation 𝑴 = 𝟗, 𝑤 = 1, 𝑁𝐶 = 0 
9 Lower Purchase Motivation 𝑴 = 𝟐, 𝑤 = 1, 𝑁𝐶 = 0 
 
We start by interpreting each factor. The most straightforward one is by changing the 
motivation of agents to purchase A/C units. This scenario serves as a sanity check for the validity 
of the individual behavioral model. The result is obvious. By increasing the motivation of buying 
A/C units, more agents investment in A/C which effectively saves more lives. On the other hand, 
if people have low motivation to purchase A/C units, the vulnerability of the region increase 
substantially. As an interesting finding, from the cumulative mortality curve, we find that 
although the total mortality is not as much as the worst cases, when decreasing people’s 




last few years, the mortality of this scenario is indeed uprising and surpasses scenarios with less 
social interactions. 
Then we focus on changing the social invitation ratio. For these three cases, if there is no 
social network, meaning that every household can only rely on themselves, significantly more 
people would purchase A/C units. However, though the coverage of A/C is a higher, less lives 
are saved compared to any other scenario with social invitations. The reason are two-fold. On 
one hand, people are learning their lessons after an exposure to the heat waves, which inevitably 
increase the health risks of the agents. On the other hand, with a high coverage of A/C units, the 
chances of losing power increase for the region. Meanwhile, when we increase the chance of 
friend invitations, it describes one of the best scenarios where most people can be saved – even 
without any government mitigation like cooling centers. This scenario has the lowest A/C 
coverage ratio except for decreasing agent’s A/C purchase motivation. It has the lowest chance 
of losing power and saves the most in terms of both resources and lives.  
Finally, we analyze the effect of opening cooling centers in the city. Cooling centers can help 
the agents mitigate and save lives. Obviously, more availability spaces from the cooling center 
mean more lives can be saved, while the coverage of A/C decreases accordingly. This shows the 
importance of instructing vulnerable population about the availability of cooling centers, which 






Figure 3-7 Lives saved from mitigation and AC penetration ratio for multiple scenarios.  





3.6  Conclusion 
 
In this work, we built an Agent Based Model as the platform to study the evolution of heat 
wave vulnerability of a community and increase our understanding of how individual mitigation 
behaviors, social connections, climate change, power outages, and government mitigation aid 
interact with each other and change the evolution of community vulnerability. We calibrated 
agents learning, decision making, and interactions in a historical weather climate of Baltimore 
City, MD. Then we conducted a sensitivity analysis on key parameters, such as the temperature, 
purchase motivation of AC units, available slots in cooling centers, and social invitation strength.  
We found that higher temperatures will trigger more mitigation, which in turns lower the 
mortality over time. Meanwhile, we found that social invitation and cooling centers are the most 
effective mitigation measures. Without social intervention, though with a very high A/C 
penetration ratio, most mortality would occur while the likelihood of losing power is high and 
people in poverty could not afford to invest in A/C units. On the other hand, cooling centers do 
have the potential to further reduce the mortality targeting vulnerable populations, but it also 
means that people should have a correct knowledge regarding the heat wave events and the 
availability of cooling centers from the information spread by the government. Furthermore, if 
power outage happen less frequently from the effort of utility companies, this would also be 
beneficial for the region’s heat resistance. These findings are valuable to achieve the most 
resilient community with all parties’ efforts, to increase social bonding, AC coverage, robustness 
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Power outage prediction for natural hazards usually relies on one of two approaches, 
statistical models or fragility-based methods. Statistical models have provided strong predictive 
accuracy, but only in an area-aggregated manner. Fragility-based approaches have not offered 
strong prediction accuracy and have been limited to systems for which system topology or 
performance models are available. In this chapter, we create an algorithm that (1) generates a 
synthetic power system layout for any U.S. city based only on public data and then (2) simulates 
power outages at the level of individual buildings under hazard loading using fragility functions. 
This approach provides much more localized, building-level estimates of the likelihood of losing 
power due to a natural hazard. We validate our model by comparing the network properties and 
power outage events based on our approach with data from a real power system in Ohio. We find 
that our model relies on less input data comparing to statistical learning approaches yet can make 







Power outages regularly cause large economic losses, impact other critical infrastructure 
systems and significantly disrupt daily life. The leading cause of large-scale power outages in the 
U.S. are severe weather events, though other natural hazards such as earthquakes can lead to 
significant outage events as well (1). By some estimates, 75% of power outages are either directly 
caused by weather-induced faults, or indirectly through failure of aging equipment exposed to 
significant weather events(2). For example, in 2012, a powerful derecho struck the Midwestern 
United States and caused 4.2 million customers across 11 states to lose power. Power restoration 
took up to 10 days for some areas (3).  
Power outage estimation can help power utilities, the managers of other critical infrastructure 
that are dependent on power, governments, and private organizations with both short-term event 
response and longer-term resilience planning. In the short term, pre-event power outage 
estimation can help utilities better plan their response and thus better balance cost and restoration 
speed. For large-scale outage events, utilities rely heavily on outside personnel and restoration 
material through mutual aid agreements. These resources are critical in restoring power quickly 
but are very costly, with restoration costs in the tens of millions of dollars per day for larger 
utilities (4). If a utility underestimates the outages from a forecast weather event and does not 
bring in enough mutual aid, their customers face prolonged outages. On the other hand, if a 
utility overestimates outages and brings in more mutual aid than is needed, they incur 
unnecessarily high costs which must then be borne by either rate-payers or corporate owners or 
shareholders. In the longer term, being able to estimate the likelihood of power outages at the 
individual building level from both weather events and other hazards such as earthquakes and 
floods can help utilities better understand where system strengthening may be needed. Building-




understand and improve their resilience locally through considerations of back-up power, power 
disruption insurance (for a commercial entity), and other measures. 
There are two main approaches for estimating power outages in the literature, statistical 
models and fragility-based models (5,6). These will be discussed in more details in Section 2, but 
briefly, statistical models have been implemented successfully in practice and can provide 
accurate estimates of power outages due to a forecast weather event at a spatial unit scale (e.g., 
census tract, zip code, or county). However, to date, they have not provided building-level 
estimates. On the other hand, fragility-based approaches do provide building-level outage 
estimates but they (1) rely on data about the power system layout that is not usually available, (2) 
have not shown strong accuracy to date and (3) can be computationally difficult and require a 
non-negligible amount of data collection effort to scale up to national or global level analysis. 
 The work in this chapter significantly advances the second of these approaches – 
fragility-based outage estimation – by developing a new framework to accurately estimate the 
probability of losing power at the individual building level using only publicly available data. 
The fragility-based approach simulates how each component of the system fails given fragility 
curves and determines the functionality of the system given these failure components. However, 
there is a fundamental challenge. The topology of power distribution systems is not publicly 
available in the U.S. due to security concerns. Because of this, we first develop a method to 
generate a synthetic power distribution system based on only publicly available data. The method 
is generalizable throughout the US and can be scaled from the city level to a larger spatial level, 
such as county level or state level.  We then develop a method to simulate power outages at the 
building level based on this synthetic system in combination with hazard loading and fragility 




hurricanes, flooding, and earthquakes, provided that relevant hazard loading maps and fragility 
curves are available. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We first discuss previous research on power 
outage prediction, synthetic power grid generation, and infrastructure vulnerability analysis. We 
then introduce our methodology to generate a synthetic distribution system and how to simulate 
its performance under hazard loading. Next we validate our synthetic network layouts against 
actual distribution systems and at last we test the outage simulations against historical large-scale 
power outage events to demonstrate the accuracy and functionality of the system. 
 
4.3 Literature Review 
 
Before giving an overview of the related literature, one point of clarification is needed. Most 
outages due to severe weather events occur in the power distribution system, while for 
earthquakes there is often also damage to substations (and sometimes the transmission system 
and generators) (7). In comparison to the power transmission system, the power distribution 
system, which delivers power from local substations to each customer, is more vulnerable and 
more likely to be damaged and cause customers to lose power during adverse weather events (8). 
For the distribution system, when a line breaks, a pole falls, or a distribution substation fails, 
customers that are downstream of the failed devices will be isolated and lose power unless there 
is an alternate set of lines that can serve that customer (9). This redundancy is rare in power 
distribution systems; most power distribution systems are dominantly radial in design (10,11). The 
method we present in this chapter focuses on low voltage substations and the distribution system, 




information is available. Our literature review covers both systems. We first review previous 
work on statistical approaches for power outage prediction. Then we review methods of 
generating synthetic power systems followed by a review of fragility curves and outage 
estimation approaches based on fragility curves. 
4.3.1 Statistical power outage predictions 
 
One of the main approaches in both the research literature and in use in practice for estimating 
power outages are statistical methods. Many, though not all, of these studies focus on tropical 
cyclones (5,12–18). Others focus more broadly on a range of weather conditions (19). These 
approaches use data from past events together with a wide array of explanatory variables to 
develop statistical and machine learning models to predict power outages due to a forecast weather 
event. 
The statistical models used for outage and damage forecasting have varied from relatively 
simple generalized linear and generalized additive models in early work (13,20) to regression trees 
(15) to ensembles of trees and other machine learning methods more recently (5,16,18,19,21,22) . One 
consistent challenge in using statistical approaches for outage forecasting is zero-inflation of the 
outage data, meaning that even for significant adverse events, many more areas experience zero 
outages than experience outages if the spatial units used are small. Guikema et al. developed a 
two-stage process that combines a classification model and a regression model to first predict in a 
given area whether power outages will occur or not, then proceed to estimate the severity of the 
outages (e.g. number of outages) (23). Shashaani et al. (2018) and Kabir et al. (2019) developed 
three-stage approaches that introduced a new stage to predict the severity class of power outages 




Statistical outage forecasting models have focused on severe weather events, and the input data 
used has consequently focused on features that may help predict the number of outages. This has 
included weather forecast information from numerical weather forecasting models (19,24) or, for 
hurricanes, from hurricane wind field models (5,16,20). It has also included information about the 
assets exposed to the hazard such as the numbers of poles, transformers, and wire spans in each 
spatial unit (17–20). In addition, it has also included a range of features that describe local geography, 
plant species, utility vegetation management, pre-storm soil moisture levels, and plant species in 
each area (17,25). These features have been found to offer improved predictive accuracy. Other 
approaches, particularly those of Guikema et al. and Nateghi et al. have sought to use a reduced 
set of input features to predict power outages due to hurricanes (16,26). The advantages of easier 
implementation in practice and potentially greater generalizability, but at the cost of some loss of 
predictive accuracy. Regardless of the details, all of these approaches provide outage estimates at 
the level of an aggregated spatial level, which may vary from relatively small (e.g., 5km by 5km 
square) grid cells to census tracts, counties, or utility operating districts. They do not provide 
building or facility-level estimates. 
 
4.3.2 Fragility curves and fragility curve based methods 
 
The other main approach for estimating loss of power and power system damage due to 
natural hazards is one based on fragility curves. This is the approach implemented in HAZUS, a 
natural hazards loss estimation software package supported by the U.S. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). A fragility curve is a function giving the probability of a 




quantified disaster intensity metric. For example, a fragility curve could give the probability that 
a substation is in each of four damage severity states as a function of the ground shacking, 
measured by peak ground acceleration, due to an earthquake at that substation’s location. One of 
the more widely used set of fragility curves are those in HAZUS for damage to infrastructure 
components and buildings from earthquakes, wind events, floods, and tsunamis (27,28).  
Fragility functions are of course hazard-dependent, and some hazards are more well-studied 
than others. Fragility functions for power system components for seismic events have been 
particularly well-studied. Power system components can be divided into micro-components (e.g., 
coil support, circuit breaker, transformer) and macro-components (a combination of micro-
components). Vanzi developed some of the earliest fragility functions for electric power system 
components for seismic events based on a functional form given by a cumulative lognormal 
distribution (29). HAZUS includes fragility curves for a broader set of power system assets, 
including generation plants, substations, and distribution. For example, HAZUS classifies 
substations into low voltage, medium voltage and high voltage. For each voltage level, the 
substation can be anchored or unanchored. It then describes the damage of electric power 
substation from earthquake with five different severity states and provides the lognormal 
parameters of the probability the substation exceeds each damage state given the peak ground 
acceleration.  
Fragility curves for strong wind events are not as developed as for seismic events, though 
significant progress has been made in the last several years. The most critical asset for wind 
events is the poles in the system as these are the major locations of failures and thus cause of 
outages during wind events. An early approach is that of Han et al. which used a structural 




probability distribution, and then updated this with observed pole failure data (30). However, they 
were hampered by insufficient observations of pole states after events. Mohammadi et al. 
provide a more recent and comprehensive study on utility poles fragility curves for strong wind 
events (31). They consider pole age, conductor area, height and wind direction as variables in the 
lognormal fragility function. However, none of this prior work incorporates the impact of trees 
falling and shedding branches onto power lines or power poles in their functions, and this can be 
a major cause of failure (16,32).  
A set of fragility curves on its own is not a complete model for estimating power outages. 
The fragility curves must be coupled with a method for simulating realizations of damage states 
of the set of assets and then for translating each of these realizations into an estimate of which 
customers lose power. If the actual power distribution system layout is known, then this is a 
relatively straight-forward task. Typically, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate N 
replications of asset damage states, where one replication includes a damage state for each asset 
in the system. Then either a power flow or, more often for a distribution system level analysis, a 
connectivity-based model is used to determine whether or not each customer has power based on 
the set of assets damaged between that customer and the substation serving them. If there is 
redundancy in the system, then a power flow analysis is likely necessary instead of a simple 
connectivity model (33).  
A challenge is that the actual power system layout is rarely available at the distribution level, 
which is the level that is most needed for outage estimation. Power utilities do not share this data 
publicly due to security concerns. While specific researchers do get access to the layouts for 
specific utilities for specific projects, this to date has made it very difficult to apply fragility-




example, Winkler et al. (2010) assumed that all roads in a city had a power line and then used 
this to simulate outages. This, however, does not approximate the topology of actual distribution 
systems well, particularly in how each building is connected through the network to a substation. 
An alternative, the one we develop further in this chapter, is to generate synthetic layouts that 
better represent the layout of power systems. 
 
4.3.3 Synthetic power system generation 
 
There has been some previous work on synthetic power grid generation. Most of this 
previous research has focused on the transmission system (34–37). For example, Birchfield et al. 
propose a method to generate synthetic transmission systems together with validation criteria for 
these systems (34). They first place high voltage substations with a clustering algorithm 
considering the spatial distribution of customers. Then they add in transmission lines that would 
meet power flow constraints. They test their model with a 2000-bus public test case. Soltan and 
Zussman (2016) present a Geographical Learner and Generator Algorithm (GLGA) to generate 
synthetic transmission networks similar to a given network comparing similar structural and 
spatial properties such as average path length, clustering coefficient, degree distribution of the 
nodes, and length distribution of the lines. Some recent work also tries to model synthetic 
distribution networks (38,39). Pisano et al. use georeferenced information and other publicly 
available open data to estimate the energy consumption of a region.  Based on locations of 
primary substations and territory segmentation they create the layout of the distribution system 
which can be used further in optimization studies. However, these generated synthetic 




determining power outages during natural disasters because they, (1) lack critical details such as 
the locations of poles undergrounding and (2) lack validation against actual distribution systems. 
For the distribution grid, considerable work has been focused on optimal layouts of 
distribution networks (40–42).Miranda et al. (1994) used a genetic algorithm to plan the placement 
of new distribution network to expand from an existing system. They assumed the network to be 
radial and optimized the system to minimize new facility installation costs and operation costs 
under constraints such as power flow, voltage drop, and power demand etc. Their approach starts 
with possible sites for substations and potential power line locations and uses the genetic 
algorithm to find an optimal solution for this binary integer optimization problem. Valenzuela et 
al. (2019) used a Minimum Spanning Tree model to create a distribution network with 
georeferenced data (e.g. customers’ locations, street point positions). They focus on the optimal 
allocation of distribution transformers and assumed undergrounding lines only, a situation that 
would be quite uncommon in the U.S. The goal is to create a distribution network that minimizes 
the total load shed during extreme events. Overall, these approaches provide starting points, but 
there does not yet exist an approach that allows us to create a synthetic power distribution 
network that is representative of power distribution systems and then to simulate hazard-induced 
failures and estimate the probability of loss of power at the individual building level. This is the 








4.4.1 Assumptions and information needed 
 
Even though distribution network layouts are not publicly available, two critical aspects that 
help define a distribution network can be acquired or can be proxied. One of these is the location 
of customers (power meters). We know that every building in a developed nation can receive 
electric power so we can assume the locations of meters are the locations of buildings and that 
each building must thus be served by the synthetic system. This is not an exact representation of 
the number of customers because, for example, some multi-unit buildings have multiple meters. 
However, the spatial distribution of building locations is a good proxy for the actual customer 
locations for the purpose of creating locations for synthetic power lines. Such information can be 
retrieved from building footprints that are publicly available for most cities in the US.  
Another critical component in developing a synthetic power distribution system is the location 
of distribution substations. The locations of distribution substations are publicly available from 
open-source map platforms5. We can view these substations as power supply points that deliver 
power to the distribution feeders leading to each customer.  
Three key assumptions underlie our approach for generating synthetic power distribution 
systems. These assumptions are:  
1) All powerlines are within roads’ rights-of-way, 
 




2) the system is designed in manner that at least approximately the least-cost method of 
connecting all customers in terms of total line miles, and 
3) the network is radial. That is, it has a tree-structure. 
None of these are strictly true for all real systems. However, they are true for large portions of 
many U.S. power distribution systems (43), and, as we show below, they allow us to achieve our 
goal of accurately estimating the likelihood of power outages at the individual building level based 
on only publicly available information. We will elaborate further on these below. With these two 
sets of locations, customers and substations, and three key assumptions, we can create a synthetic 
distribution power network to simulate power outages under extreme hazard events.  
We focus our approach on the major power infrastructure components that could be damaged 
by natural hazards. That is, rather than trying to model every component, we focus on the asset 
classes that are the main sources of loss of power and that correspond to the available fragility 
curves, namely substations, poles, and power lines. Different types of power system components 
have different responses to natural disasters. Substations, which transform voltage from high to 
low, are more likely to be damaged during earthquakes and flooding events than during wind 
events. In a radial system, damage to substations may lead to loss of entire feeders (a set of 
distribution lines serving one portion of a substation’s service area), creating an outage that impacts 
many customers simultaneously. Poles are more likely to be damaged during strong wind events 
and, if there is liquefaction, during earthquakes. Pole damage in a radial system cuts power to all 
downstream customers. Above-ground power lines can be damaged from falling trees and limbs 
and blown debris, and below-ground lines can be damaged due to flooding. Fragility curves, e.g., 
those in HAZUS, often aggregate the line damage probabilities and assign it to the closest upstream 




We create network layouts for a power distribution system, each of which describes how each 
customer gets power from distribution substations through power lines. Each layout is a graph with 
the customers, substations, and poles as vertices and the power lines as the edges. This introduces 
three questions we need to answer: 1) which substation each customer gets power from, 2) the 
route from each substation to each customer, and 3) whether the power lines in each location are 
overhead or underground.  
 As discussed above, one of our key assumptions is that power lines are strictly along the roads. 
Based on our observation from the actual distribution layout in our case study system, that of 
Franklin County, Ohio, the average distance from a powerline to the nearest road is less than 100m 
for 92% of power lines are within 100m to roads. We calculate the Euclidean distance from each 
end point of each segment of power line polyline to the closest road intersections and average the 
value for each polyline to make this calculation.  
One of the major advantages of our approach is the low requirement of data collection in 
comparison to statistical learning approaches (18). We use only open-source data, i.e., road layouts, 
building locations, partial building information, and substation locations, to generate the power 
system network. Road layouts are shapefiles available from United States Census Bureau at the 
county level6. Power demands locations are the coordinates of each customer within the city/region 
boundaries. We extract these coordinates from any given city’s building footprints and 
approximate each customer location with the centroid of each building7. For supply points, we 








by many types of hazards (8). We use open-source map query website overpass.turbo to identify 
all the substation locations and download them and we use Zillow.com to retrieve building 
information. With this set of information, we can then create our synthetic power network that 
provides power connectivity from substations to all customers. 
 
4.4.2 Network Generation Methodology 
In this section, we introduce the process of generating a synthetic power system layout with 
different approaches and validate those layouts. In general, the process can be divided into 6 
steps as the flow chart in Figure 4-1 shows. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 The six steps of our synthetic power distribution system network generation algorithm 
4.4.2.1 Customer clustering 
 
The first step in generating the distribution system is to create a cluster of customers served by 
each substation. This process answers our first question in synthetic distribution network 




are typically radial,  each customer is served by only one substation. In practice,  many assign 
customers to substations based on closest euclidean distance. However, this is not necessarily the 
case. Sometimes for a customer, the closest substation following the path of power lines is not the 
the substatuion with the closest euclidian distance. For example, topological effects, water bodies, 
and other considerations can lead a customer to be served by a substation other than the closest 
Euclidean distance substation. The assumption that customers are served by the closest substation 
by euclidian distance can lead to substantially different results for risk assessment purposes . It 
eliminates the possibility the customer is actually served by another substation which experiences 
a very different damage condition. It is crucial to determine the potential substation service 
territory based on network distance, not euclidian distance. 
Our method uses the following approach to determine the service territory of each substation. 
We first calculate the distances from each customer to all the substations along the road network. 
Then for each customer, we find the closest substation based on network distances. This gives us 
a basic customer cluster for each substation. This is helpful to determine the service substation for 
customers that are only close to one substation. However for customers that have a similar network 
distances to multiple substations, we generate multiple realizations of the layout that allow these 
customers to be in different clusters. This acknowledges that we are uncertain about which 
substation they are served by. We define 𝑐𝑖 as the cluster that customer 𝑖 belongs to and  𝑑𝑛(𝑖, 𝑗) 
as the network distance between customer 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑁] with substation 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑀]. Then we have 







 <  b                      (1) 
where b is the threshold (10-20%) to constrain the relative distances from customers to other 
substations comparing to their closest substation. This means that customers on the boarders of 




As an example shown in Figure 4-2, where there are two substations A and B. Orange customers 
and yellow customers are served by substation A and B respectively as they are very close to their 
substation. The two green customers have a similar distances to both substations, so they are 
considered to be in both substation clusters. This does not mean green customers are served by 
two substations at the same time but they are simulated independently in each substation cluster 
that has them, generating multiple network layouts that form an ensemble. As the output from the 
simulation, depending on the purpose of the study, we can choose to report the average probability 
across the ensemble or the highest probability across the ensemble of the green customers losing 
power from substation cluster A and B. 
 
Figure 4-2 Illustration of border customers and their assignment to different substations 
 




Instead of creating a fully connected distribution network that connects all the substations and 
customers, we can create multiple reduced distribution networks given each substation cluster. 
This simplifies computation and better reflects the layout of real substations. For each substation 
cluster, we generate a buffer that is slightly larger than the spatial locations of customers. As an 
example, in figure 4-2, the two substation clusters A and B, along with their customers and the 
roads within each square buffer compose two independent reduced problems. Then for each 
reduced problem, we create connectivity for each customer to get power from the substation. The 
benefit from creating the reduced problem is that it can reduce the computational effort relative to 
running algorithms on the entire system and it is a reasonable relaxation to the original problem as 
the actual system is typically radial and separated into substation feeders in the US. 
 
4.4.2.3 Generate poles and road segmentation 
Each customer in a typical power distribution system is connected to the substation through a 
combination of overhead lines (required utility poles) and underground lines. Therefore, we need 
to split the roads into segments such that that the distance between two nodes is similar to the 
actual distance between poles. For each road’s polyline, we define the coordinates of all the nodes 
of the polyline as the sequence as (𝑥1, 𝑦1), (𝑥2, 𝑦2), … , (𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛). We define these nodes as power 
nodes. The point (𝑥1, 𝑦1) is the beginning node of the road segment, and (𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛) is the ending 
node. We define the Euclidean distance between point 𝑖 and 𝑗 as 𝑑𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗). The sequence of the 
polyline can be reversed. We assume the distance between poles to be a constant 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑒 , and we 
assume this is 40 meters based on our observations of the pole distribution of actual systems. 




different span length for overhead lines. We define 𝑆 as the set containing all the power nodes we 
created from the road shapefile.  
The algorithm is as follows. We start by putting (𝑥1, 𝑦1) into 𝑆. If the distance between (𝑥1, 𝑦1) 
and (𝑥2, 𝑦2) is less or equal to 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑒, we put (𝑥2, 𝑦2) into 𝑆. If the distance is larger than 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑒, we 
split the line between (𝑥1, 𝑦1) and (𝑥2, 𝑦2) evenly and the number of nodes added is determined 
by the floor of 𝑑𝑒(1,2)/𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑒 . For example, if 𝑑𝑒(1,2) = 50𝑚 , we will add in one point 
(𝑥1.1, 𝑦1.1) in the middle of the polyline. We then put in nodes (𝑥1.1, 𝑦1.1) and (𝑥2, 𝑦2) into 𝑆. As 
a result, 𝑆 should contains all the original nodes from road polylines and new nodes created when 
the distance between neighboring nodes are further than 𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑒 . If a power node belongs to an 
overhead power line, it will be viewed as a utility pole which can be exposed and damaged by 
wind or earthquake-induced liquification. A power feeder node is defined as the power node that 
is used to connect to at least one customer. 
 
4.4.2.4 Generate distribution network 
The next step is to create connectivity within each cluster to deliver power from substations to 
customers. We compare three different models to accomplish this goal: Steiner tree, K-mean 
clustering Steiner tree, and shortest path. 
The first method we consider is to connect all customers and the substation in a minimum cost 
manner. In another words, we want to find the tree with the minimum cost that connects all the 
nodes of interests on an undirected graph. This is the problem of finding the Steiner tree on the 
graph (44). Our base network is the road layouts as we constrain our power lines to be along roads. 




calculate the closest power node for each building, and those power nodes with at least one 
customer near it will be considered as important nodes. The Steiner tree problem is a well-studied 
NP-hard problem, and many approximation algorithms have been created to reduce the difference 
from the optimal Steiner tree to the approximation solution (45). We use an approximation algorithm 
created by Takahashi and Matsuyama (44). We define the original road network as an undirected 
graph 𝐺 = (𝑁, 𝐸), consisting the set 𝑁 of all the potential power nodes we created from 4.4.2.3 
and the set 𝐸 of all the road segments that connect the power nodes. We define another undirected 
graph 𝐺′ = (𝑁′, 𝐸′) to be the Steiner tree we are looking for, 𝑁′ ∈ 𝑁, 𝐸′ ∈ 𝐸. The weight of each 
edge is the length of the road segment. We define set 𝑁𝐼 ∈ 𝑁  of all the power feeders. The 
algorithm is as following. 
Algorithm 1. Steiner tree to generate distribution layout 
Step 1: Select a random vertex 𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝐼, and find a vertex 𝑡 ∈ 𝑁
′, 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡 that gives the shortest 
weighted path 𝑒𝑠𝑡 to 𝑠.  Add 𝑒 to 𝐸
′ and all the vertices in 𝑒𝑠𝑡 to 𝑁
′. This gives a starting tree that 
connects 𝑠 and 𝑡. Remove 𝑠 and 𝑡 from 𝑁𝐼. 
Step 2: Search from all the vertices in 𝑁𝐼 and find a vertex 𝑢 such that the weighted path 𝑒𝑢 
from 𝑢 to 𝐺′ is the shortest. We then add 𝑒𝑢 and all the vertices in 𝑒𝑢 to 𝑁
′. We then remove 𝑢 
from 𝑁𝐼. 
Step 3: Repeat Step 2 until all the vertices in 𝑁𝐼 have been connected to 𝐺′ and 𝑁𝐼 becomes 
empty. 
The second method we examine is called K-mean clustering Steiner tree. The intuition of this 
method is trying to imitate the development progress of communities. We assume that the 
development of each substation cluster’s distribution system begins with building major power 




within each group of buildings are added, connecting to the original main power line. The 
algorithm changes as following. 
Algorithm 2. Steiner tree with K-mean clustering to generate distribution layout 
Step 1: Spatially cluster customers within each substation cluster with a K-mean algorithm and 
determine the best number of clusters based on silhouette score. We use the closest power node to 
each cluster center in 𝐺 as our centers for communities, i.e. 𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑛3.  
Step 2: Then connect the substation’s closest power node 𝑛𝑠 to each substation cluster’s power 
nodes 𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑛3  with the shortest weighted path on 𝐺. Then add these vertices and arcs in 𝐺′. 
Remove substation power nodes and community cluster power nodes from 𝑁𝐼. 
Step 3: Apply the Steiner tree algorithm to include all the important nodes and paths into 𝐺′. 
The third method we examine to connect each building to the substation is a shortest weighted 
path approach. If we have power feeders (𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑛3 … ) and the substation power node 𝑛𝑠, then we 
find the shortest path from each power feeder node to a substation power node  and include the 
path into 𝐺′. In this way, all the buildings are connected to the substation most efficiently. This 
method can be viewed as a special case to the second method when the number of clusters is equal 




Each of these three methods generates a distribution layout for each substation cluster. The 
distribution network connects each customer to a power node, which is connected to the substation. 
This connectivity pathway is critical in the simulation step of our algorithm because we assume 
that if a customer is connected to a substation, they can receive power. That is, we ignore power 
flow constraints in our radial power distribution system. Therefore, the distance from the 
substation to a customer is crucial in determining the customer’s probability of losing power. The 
further the customer is to the substation, the more components (e.g., poles) there likely are between 
the customer and the substation, increasing the possibility of a disruption on the distribution path 
to cut off power to the customer. Therefore, one of the validation criteria we use below is a 




comparison of network distance from each customer to the substation in our synthetic network 
with that in the actual distribution network.  
Simple examples of the three methods are shown in Figure 4-3. Green dots are power feeders 
that deliver power from the distribution network to customers, and the triangle is the substation. 
The goal is to connect all of them on the network grid with certain rules. We assume each dashed 
line represent roads, and we implement the three methods we proposed to solve the same 
problem. The three plots in the middle give examples of intermediate steps while solving the 
problem with each method. The orange lines are expected to be the next power lines to be added 
into the prior solution represented by blue lines. The three plots on the right are the final solution 
from each network generation method. The two red stars in the “ST+Kmean” plot are cluster 
centers. 
4.4.2.5 Overhead/underground power lines classification 
It is critical to determine whether each power line is overhead or underground because 
overhead and underground lines have substantially different vulnerabilities to hazards. We use a 
random forest classifier to estimate whether each line is overhead or underground, and the 
flowchart of this classification process for each substation cluster is shown in Figure 4-4. This 
approach uses the actual status – overhead vs. underground – of each line segment in the actual 
system we have data for together with housing characteristics of the area around the lines to 
develop a predictive machine learning classifier. The assumption here, based on observations 
working with data from multiple utilities, is that underground lines are more likely in certain types 
of areas such as those with newer homes with higher values. 
We start by collecting real estate information for the area from Zillow.com. Other sources of 




take a few factors into consideration as predictive variables and train a statistical learning model 
to classify the line type that connect to the building. Undergrounding technology became more 
prevalent in the 1970s in the U.S., and it tends to be associated with larger, more valuable homes. 
For each home we query, we obtain the year built, the Zillow-estimated value, the finished size of 
the home, the parcel (lot) size, and the tax assessment as our covariates. The status of the power 
line nearest to the building (overhead vs. underground) is the response variable. We train random 
forest classifier and validate the model with holdout tests. We then finalize the model by training 
the random forest with that variable subset with the whole dataset.  
In practice, due to the difficulties of scraping the housing data (Zillow API query is limited to 
1000/day), we could only get house information for a small portion of houses. For example, it took 
us 14 days to retrieve information for 60,000 houses out of the 650,000 houses for Franklin County, 
Ohio. As a result, the line type of 90% of powerlines cannot be directly predicted by the model 
due to a lack of housing information on those roads. Therefore, we first predict the powerline type 
for each house with existing data. Then we aggregate each house’s powerline type to its closest 
road by using the majority line type. For example, for a given synthetic powerline, if we scraped 
four houses along the powerline and three of the houses are predicted to be overhead and one to 




be underground, then we classify the powerline type of this synthetic powerline to be overhead. If 
there is a tie, we choose overhead as the powerline type.  
Then for synthetic powerlines without any scraped houses along them, we spawn their 
powerline types from powerlines that have been classified. To do this, we iterate through all the 
unclassified powerlines, and find their connected powerlines. The powerline type of undetermined 
powerlines will be randomly sampled from their neighboring and classified powerlines’ types. If 
none of an unclassified powerline has been determined, this powerline will remain undetermined 
until the next round. After all the unclassified powerlines have been iterated, we start the process 
again for any powerlines that are still unclassified. The process ends when all the powerlines are 
assigned a powerline type.  
 
4.4.3 Power outage simulation 
 
With the synthetic power system generated, we can use it to simulate power outages due to 
natural hazards through use of infrastructure fragility curves. The simulation scheme is shown in 
Figure 4-5. This algorithm estimates the probability of each customer point losing power due to a 





Figure 4-5 Simulation framework for estimating power outages at the household level given a network layout 
and asset-level fragility curves 
 
Our synthetic power system can be used to simulate power outages for many types of natural 
hazards provided we have (1) a proper spatial map of the loading due to the hazard and (2) valid 
fragility functions for poles and substations that converts the hazard loading parameters into asset-
level failure probabilities. We explain the framework with using strong wind events as an example.  
As a starting point, we have as our inputs the network layouts for each substation cluster, a map 
of wind speeds over the study area, and fragility functions that give the probability of failure as a 
function of wind speed. Network layouts consist of the distribution layouts for each substation 
cluster of the study area. In our example we use three-second wind gust speed as our hazard loading 
measure. The fragility functions then give the probability of pole failures for a given wind speed. 
For each substation cluster, we simulate the power outages with a sufficient number of replications 
(1000) for the probability of power outages of each customer to converge. Within the simulation, 
we first simulate which infrastructures fail, i.e., poles and substations. Then we change the network 
structure by removing these assets. The last step is to check if each customer still has connectivity 




because of pole or power line failures, or their substations are damaged, they will lose power. As 
a result, by integrating across all of the replications for each house, we can estimate the probability 
of a house losing power due to the simulated event, which can be informative to government, 
utility companies, and decision makers.  
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Case study 
Franklin County, Ohio is our primary case study. There are approximately 655,440 buildings 
in this county with a population of approximately 1.3 million. Our algorithm can conceptually be 
applied to any city, county, or an entire state if the required data is available and there are 
sufficient computational resources. We choose Franklin county, Ohio because we have the 
historical power outage data to compare our algorithm’s output to, and we have the distribution 
system’s actual layout which enables us to validate the layout generated by our model. We 
present our validations from two aspects, the similarity of our synthetic networks to the actual 
distribution network with multiple metrics, and the performance of our model in simulating a 
historical power outage event. We then show an application of the approach to a different area, 
Corpus Christi, Texas, for which we have some, but less spatially detailed, information to 
validate against. This provides at least some confidence in the ability to generalize the approach 
to other locations. 
4.5.2 Network validation 
The purpose of our synthetic model is to provide informative risk assessment of the impacts of 
hazards on the power system of an area. As such, comparing the end to end prediction performance 




compare network structure of our synthetic power network with the actual distribution network 
and evaluate how accurate our overhead/underground classifier is in comparison to the actual 
layout. These similarity-based validation metrics are important because, if the algorithm accurately 
reflects key properties of real systems, we can have more confidence in the applicability of the 
approach to hazards beyond the limited set of validation events that we have to compare to. 
4.5.2.1 Network similarity 
To compare the similarity between networks, we first compare global network parameters, such 
as the average nodal degree, betweenness centrality, number of circles, and the total length of the 
network. These parameters are commonly used to represent the attributes of network graphs, but 
they are not necessarily informative for risk assessment purposes (33). We compare these metrics 
for each substation cluster we create with all three methods.  
Nodal degree is the number of nodes that directly connect to a given node. From Table 1 we 
see that the average nodal degrees we generate with all three approaches are all close to the actual 
distribution network. This is clearly the result of the fundamental structure of distribution network 
because most of the nodes (poles) in the graph are connected with only two other nodes aiming to 
deliver electricity. Betweenness centrality quantifies the number of times a node acts as a bridge 
along the shortest path between two other nodes. The average betweenness centrality is also at the 
same level between the two systems. The average Number of Circle describes the average number 
of loops in each substation cluster. We only consider the overhead system in this metric because 
underground systems are typically built as open loops with switches for extra robustness and from 
the data available to us form the utility, we cannot determine the actual connectivity of the 
undergrounding network. Table 4-1 shows that circles are rare in real overhead distribution 




systems are, by design, completely radial. Lastly, we also compare the total length of our synthetic 
system versus the actual system and we find they are very close. These results show that the 
approximation using road network to the distribution network is reasonable in terms of network 
topological parameters. 

























2.066 0.0429 2.44 1.04 × 108 - - 
Steiner Tree 
Heuristic 
1.999 0.0400 0 1.08 × 108 1426 0.699 
Steiner Tree 
+ Kmean 
1.999 0.0389 0 1.09 × 108 882 0.745 
Shortest Path 1.999 0.0363 0 1.07 × 108 693 0.842 
 
One of the most important metrics for risk assessment purposes is the network distance from 
each customer to its substation. Due to the nature of radial systems, each customer is served by 
one substation. The probability of losing power for a customer is positively correlated to its 
network distance to the substation because the further the distance, the higher the number of 
potential failure points between the customer and the substation.  
We compare the actual customer to substation network distance from the distribution layout 
with the synthetic networks generated by the three algorithms we propose. For each customer, on 
the synthetic network, we calculate the shortest path to the substation it is assigned to. If a customer 
is within multiple substation clusters, we use the shortest one for comparison. The result is shown 
in the last two columns in Table 4-1. In terms of each buildings distance to the nearest substation, 
the best model we find is the shortest path model. The average absolute difference in distance to 




outperforms the other two models as well. Pearson correlation coefficient measures the linear 
correlation between two variables. These results suggest that our model, while not perfect, 
generates synthetic systems with customer distances to substations that correlate well with the 
actual values. 
 
4.5.2.2 Overhead/underground power lines classification validation 
The second step is to evaluate the accuracy of our overhead/underground classifier. We first 
test the accuracy of the random forest model given our dataset. The in-sample prediction accuracy 
with the whole dataset is 100%. More meaningful is the out of sample accuracy. The average out-
of-sample prediction accuracy in 30 repeated random holdouts is 91%. 10.6% of the synthetic 
powerlines are directly predicted from the dataset and the accuracy is 100% (due to in-sample 
prediction). After applying the powerline type spawning algorithm, the overall prediction accuracy 
for the whole network is 84.1% for our study region. One issue of our model is that it cannot 
capture commercial buildings because Zillow does not provide such information. One potential 
solution is to identify commercial area and use a pre-defined line type for power lines surrounding 
commercial areas.  
The level of accuracy of our model is strong even given our limited dataset, and it may improve 
if information on more buildings or other sources of additional real estate data become available. 
We have also directly compared the generated systems to the actual systems visually on a map. 
However, for reasons of security, the data provider does not allow the actual maps to be shown. 






4.5.3 Extreme weather simulation 
4.5.3.1 Franklin County, Ohio - Derecho, 2012 
In this section, we use the model we developed to predict power outages the Derecho that 
impacted Franklin County, Ohio on June 29, 2012. The event caused more than 50% of customers 
in the county to lose power. We have the utility outage data, aggregated to 5km grid cells, to 
compare with our model outputs. During the event, wind was the driving force of power outages. 
We retrieved the maximum gust wind speed during the event for all the airports in or near the 
county and interpolate to get the gust wind speed for each pole given the pole’s spatial location to 
those airports.  
We applied the fragility curves developed by Darestani and Shafieezade (31). The fragility of 
poles under wind events is determined by the pole class, wind speed and direction, age, diameter 
of conductors, heights. By inputting these parameters, we can estimate the probabilities of pole 
failure and use these to simulate the change of network connectivity. We repeated out analysis for 
different combinations of pole classes and ages and conduct sensitivity analysis to cover the gap 
of unknown pole information. We do not consider damage to falling trees due to lack of 
information, though we acknowledge that tree failures can be substantial causes of outages. We 
conduct a convergence test on the average customers without power for several substation clusters 
with 50,000 replications. We find that the relative difference for the average customers without 
power is converging to less than 1% after 10,000 replications. 
We compare our simulation results with the actual event in 5km by 5km grids which are shown 




different types of poles in each scenario:  60-year-old class 4 poles, 50-year-old class 5 poles, and 
60-year-old class 5 poles. These pole ages were chosen based on the average age of buildings in 
the region. The class of poles is determined by the minimum circumference that depends on the 
species of tree and the length of the pole (46). Higher-class poles (e.g. class five) typically can hold 
less horizontal load than lower-class poles (e.g. class four). Class four and five poles are typically 
used in distribution systems in the U.S.  
From these simulation scenarios we gain insights into the relative risks of losing power. In all 
cases (plots (b)-(d) in Figure 4-6), the model is capturing the power outages on the northern side 
of the region reasonably well but underestimating outages in the southern portions of the region. 
Part of the reason for this is because we do not have the most accurate wind speed data for all 
grid cells, but only the seven major airports in this area. These airports are mostly located in the 
northern part of the county. Plots (b) and (d) are both for 60-year-old poles. These two model 
runs give a total number of customers without power relatively close to the actual 279,000. The 
major difficulty in simulating this Derecho event is the to a lack of information on the hazard 
loading (i.e., wind speeds). We use only gust wind speed at major airports to approximate the 
gust wind speeds throughout the system. Informal conversations with the meteorologists from 
the utility that provided the data revealed that wind speeds were highly spatially variable during 
this event, and we lack the data to capture these local differences. To improve the simulation 






Figure 4-6 Comparison of actual and simulated power outages for the 2012 Derecho in Franklin County, OH. 
The legend shows the average number of customers without power in each grid cell. (a) actual power outage during 
the derecho, (b) If all the poles are class 4 and age 60, (c) If all the poles are class 5 and age 50, (d) If all the poles 
are class 5 and age 60. Total number of customers without power is also shown in each scenario. 
4.5.3.2 Corpus Christi - Harvey, 2017 
To test the generalizability of the approach to other areas and other events, we also simulated 
the impacts of Hurricane Harvey in southern Texas. We do not have the actual outage data for this 
area in the same level of detail but have obtained estimates of outages from media reports. We also 
do not have the full system topology to compare to. We should note that we are focusing on the 
area of Texas that experienced Harvey as a strong wind event, not primarily a flooding event (i.e., 
we are not considering the Houston area). 
Hurricane Harvey made landfall in Texas on August 23, 2017. The hurricane caused 




major cities due to strong wind, hurricane surge, and flooding caused by rainfall. We selected 
Corpus Christi to test our model because the majority of power outages there were wind driven. 
We use the best track estimation8 of hurricane Harvey and an existing hurricane wind field model 
(47) to estimate the 3-second gust wind speed for each distribution substation. We then apply the 
same wind speed from each substation to all the poles connected to that substation and simulated 
outages. The results are shown in Figure 4-7. Red areas are those areas where the buildings are 
more likely to lose power and blue are less likely to lose power. We assume the parameter for 
poles to be 40-year-old class 4 poles, 50-year-old class 4 poles, and 40-year-old class 5 poles based 
on the building stock age for the city.   
As a comparison, from media reports, the peak number of customers without power reported 
by AEP, the utility serving the area, during Harvey for Corpus Christi was approximately 91,500. 
The majority of the outages were in the Midtown area and the Southside area while the Northwest 
area was mildly damaged. With our simulation, we estimate the average number of customers 
without power as 67,000, 84,000, and 82,000, where the estimates from the latter two sets of pole 
parameters are close to the actual value. The model estimates the risk of losing power to be high 
in the midtown area for all three sets of pole parameters. For the southside area, the outage 
estimates are centered because the model estimates that the three substations in this area have 
primarily underground power lines serving customers, which is generally true after checking from 
google streetview. The other substations’ service territories are severely damaged. For the 
northwest area, especially in the scenario of 40-year-old class 4 poles, there are less customers 







agreement with the media reports of outages, at least at a high level. Overall, these simulation 
results can be a good source of information to the public, critical infrastructures, and utility 
companies to assess the potential chances of losing power and find a better way to mitigate.  
 
 
Figure 4-7 Simulation for Hurricane Harvey, 2012 for Corpus Christi. The legend shows the probability each customer with 
power. Closing to 100% indicates the customer will have a high probability of having power. Closing to 0% indicates the 






We develop a model to use synthetic network generation to cover a critical gap in power outage 
risk assessment research. We use publicly available data to create a synthetic version of the 
distribution system given building information, substation locations, and road networks. The 
method is generalizable to larger scales, from city level to county level, and potentially to state 
level. We tested our approach for Franklin county, Ohio, and Corpus Christi, TX. For Franklin 
county, we compared our network with the actual distribution network with multiple measures and 
found that the model approximated the actual system well in terms of topological characteristics. 
We also simulated two major power outage events, the Derecho in Ohio in 2012 and hurricane 
Harvey in Corpus Christi in 2017. The results of these simulations show that the model can produce 
accurate estimates of power outages provided accurate hazard loading maps are available. 
However, there are several limitations in this method that needs to be addressed. What we are 
creating is a synthetic distribution network that can be representative of the real-life system and 
can be used to estimate damage to the distribution system and household likelihood of losing power 
in the US. For other countries, it is not clear at this point if the method is applicable because 1) 
certain assumptions may no longer be held (i.e., that the distribution system is radial), 2) certain 
input data may become harder to acquire, (i.e., building information and substation locations), and 
3) the overhead and underground power line classifier may no longer work because of differences 
in how the system is designed. Some of these limitations can be resolved by introducing extra 
models to impute missing information, such as using population and power consumption 
information to create synthetic distribution substations. In the meantime, with better input data, 
the performance of certain models can be improved. For example, with a more detailed building 




addition, more information regarding the age of certain infrastructure such as poles can help 
improve the outage estimation. Overall, our work shows the effectiveness of the method with 
limited information.  
Another major challenge of the proposed method is its scalability. While the method has been 
designed for use at the scale of a metropolitan area, there may be interest in scaling up to a state 
or national level. Scaling up to state-wide or nation-wide analysis with this approach would have 
three major challenges: data collection, computing power limitations, and fragility function 
limitations. The first challenge would be how to collect the necessary input data for the model if 
applying the model to the state or national level. Road locations, building locations, and substation 
locations can all be retrieved publicly for the entire U.S., but the effort required to gather this data 
grows substantially for larger application domains. For building information, one possibility would 
be to switch to a commercially available database of building locations and characteristics. The 
second challenge is the computational power required for both network generation and network 
simulation. Highly optimized code and parallelization can increase the feasibility of this 
application. Variance reduction and sampling strategies can be leveraged for faster convergence. 
Even with these strategies, computational effort will remain a challenge for very large spatial 
domains. The last challenge is regarding fragility functions. A comprehensive set of fragility 
functions for vulnerable components of the distribution system for the hazard type being modeled 
is crucial in improving the accuracy of the estimation. For certain components under some disasters, 
the fragility functions available may not exist up to date. Resolving this issue will rely on the 
development of improved fragility functions. 
Though only tested for wind events in this chapter, we have run the model for other hazard 




validate the performance of our model against historical data. Using the model for a different 
hazard requires hazard-appropriate fragility functions and potentially the inclusion of additional 
system components if they are vulnerable under the other hazards. For example, for earthquakes, 
the damage to the distribution system comes largely from damage to low-voltage substations and 
utility poles, requiring seismic fragility functions for these components. On the other hand, for 
flooding, the height of certain utility equipment, such as substation transformers should be 
explicitly modelled to estimate their failure probabilities.  
Overall, our model provides a novel approach for estimating the building-level probability of 
losing power for a natural hazard event. We have shown that this approach can yield accurate 
predictions provided an accurate map of hazard loading is used and appropriate fragility functions 
are used. This approach has the potentially to improve predictive accuracy of power outage 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
Natural disasters bring huge challenge to our lives, to the infrastructure, and to the economy.  
A better understanding of the long-term vulnerability of individuals and communities and the 
short-term vulnerability of infrastructure can give insights and support better planning, 
preparation, recovery, and retrofitting. This study builds models to study how the long-term 
vulnerability of communities evolves under repeated hurricane and heat waves, and to estimate 
the short-term vulnerability of power distribution systems. Simulation models, agent-based 
models, network optimization and analysis, and predictive modeling approaches are used to 
answer these questions and advance vulnerability analysis. 
5.1  Summary and contributions 
5.1.1 Evolution of the long-term vulnerability under repeated hurricanes 
Hurricanes can repeatedly cause extensive economic losses in the U.S especially to 
residential building stock. However, little is understood about how repeated hazards change 
communities and impact their preparation for future events. Individual mitigation actions may 
drive how a community's resilience evolves under repeated hazards. In chapter 2, I investigate 
the effect that learning by homeowners has on household mitigation decisions and on how this 
influences a region's vulnerability to hurricanes over time. I build an Agent-Based Model (ABM) 
to simulate homeowners’ adaptation to repeated hurricanes and how this affects the vulnerability 




how different initial beliefs about the hurricane hazard and how the memory of recent hurricanes 
could change a community’s vulnerability both under current and potential future hurricane 
scenarios under climate change. In some future hurricane environments, different initial beliefs 
can result in large differences in the region’s long-term vulnerability to hurricanes. I find that 
getting some homeowners to mitigate right after a hurricane given that this is when their memory 
of the event is the strongest can help decrease the vulnerability of a community most effectively. 
There are three major contributions of this work that can have substantial impact to future 
studies in this field. First, this work proposes a general framework for how to analyze the long-
term vulnerability of a community facing repeated hazards. The framework can be used to study 
different regions, different hazards, and different agents. Second, the created ABM for repeated 
hurricanes serves as a flexible boundary object that can be used in interdisciplinary studies to 
understand each component of the complex system. The introduction of agent learning and 
decision-making models are the first step into creating more comprehensive scenarios in long-
term hurricane planning. Third, this work also reveals the impact of learning and memory decay 
from homeowners and how their decisions can alter the evolution of vulnerability of the 
community under repeated hurricanes.  
5.1.2 Evolution of the long-term vulnerability under repeated heat waves 
 
Repeated heat waves impact vulnerable populations such as the elderly and lower income 
groups that are less able to respond to high heat events. The vulnerability of these and other 
groups to heat waves changes over time in response to social connections, collective action, 
utility coordination, and government policies. In chapter 3, I create an agent-based modeling 




evolving agents, social networks, and a health mortality model to study the impact of repeated 
heatwaves on society. In this work, I find that a change of climate can influence the long-term 
vulnerability of a community in surprising ways. Increasing daily average temperatures can 
stimulate more individual mitigation behaviors and reduce the number of people that die from 
future heat waves. Social networks can also have a substantial impact in helping decrease 
mortality by providing options for cooling at friends’ houses. On the other hand, cooling centers 
can be used effectively in helping decrease mortality for a given event, but they may also 
increase the long-term vulnerability by decreasing people’s motivation to adopt mitigation, 
which increases the risks when facing an unexpected or extreme event. Only by modeling 
adaptive behavior and social interactions over time can we start to understand how community 
vulnerability evolves over time. 
There are two major contributions of this work that can have substantial impact to future 
studies in this field. This study creates a platform to study the long-term dynamics of community 
vulnerability under repeated heat waves. It can be used to incorporate different individual 
learning, behavior, and interaction models and test the output’s sensitivity from the change of 
each component. This work incorporates social networks, which is something often not 
thoroughly considered in other disaster simulation studies. I explored how individual mitigation 
choices, government policies, and social connections can result in different patterns of the 
evolution of vulnerability. Social connection along with government intervention such as cooling 
center can make a great difference to the mortality outcome. 
 





Power outage prediction can be valuable for both pre-hazard planning of resources as well as 
post-hazard or long-term system hardening planning. In chapter 4, I create an algorithm that (1) 
generates a synthetic power distribution system layout for any U.S. city based only on public 
data and then (2) simulates power outages at the level of individual buildings under hazard 
loading using fragility functions. This approach provides localized, building-level estimates of 
the likelihood of losing power due to a natural hazard. I validate this model by comparing the 
network properties and power outage events based on our approach with data from a real power 
system in Ohio. I then apply this model to estimate power outages for a historical Derecho event 
and a historical hurricane event. I find that this model relies on less input data comparing to 
statistical learning approaches yet can make accurate predictions, provided accurate fragility 
curves are available. 
There are three major contributions of this work that can have a substantial impact on future 
studies in this field. To fill the gap of the partially unknown distribution network for power 
outage prediction purposes, I use publicly available information of substations to create a 
synthetic distribution network. I compare different network generation models and find the best 
model comparing to the actual distribution network. Then, because of the huge difference in 
response to hazards for overhead and underground distribution systems, I create a random forest 
classifier that can differentiate these two types of systems given characteristics of nearby 
customer buildings. 
 
5.2 Limitation and future work 





This is the first project I have been working on since joining the Ph.D. program. The model 
created has potential in studying different aspects of the long-term vulnerability of a community 
under repeated hurricanes. In this work, I investigated in the effect of learning particularly. I also 
created models to study the impact of different learning and behavioral models, different 
government policies, land use changes and real estate markets, hurricane surge, and flood 
insurance. For example, the behavioral model of the agents can be very interesting to understand 
either an optimal solution, or the most realistic decision making to the changing environment. 
These are good topics that can be addresses with extensions of the current model. The current 
model focuses on only residential buildings. Another interesting extension of the model can be 
on a different subject. Comparing damages to residential building stocks, it is also very critical to 
study the impact on commercial buildings and analyze how their mitigation efforts can help save 
their potential future losses. 
5.2.2 Evolution of the long-term vulnerability under repeated heat waves 
 
In this work, I apply a model structure that is similar to the hurricane work but on a different 
type of hazard. Though the framework is similar, I needed to reconsider the best way to 
understand this disaster and how is it different from hurricanes. For heat waves, the focus is on 
the interplay of social networks, individual decisions, and government intervention. Social 
networks and government interventions are modeled in this work to help us understand their 
impacts on the long-term vulnerability of the community. Similar to the hurricane work, it is also 
interesting to discuss how different behavioral models and government interventions can change 
the evolution of the community. It is also interesting to see how we can combine the hurricane 




community and evaluate this complex system. This can be the first step into creating a multi-
hazard simulation platform for long-term hazard planning. 
5.2.3 Weather-related power outage prediction 
 
Power outage prediction is a topic I have been very interested in since the beginning of my 
Ph.D. I have been working on both statistical based approach and simulation-based approach for 
power outage prediction. For both methods, they have restrictions that limit them from being a 
universally applicable model.  
The primary challenge for statistical-based approach is its generalizability. We have seen 
from many works that with sufficient data for certain region for a certain type of hazard or 
weather event, the trained model can be relatively accurate in out-of-sample predictions and can 
be used in practice. However, if the hazard is a rare event without much data, i.e., earthquakes, or 
the study region’s system or infrastructure characteristics are very different from the training 
region, then the prediction accuracy may be compromised. For a simulation-based method the 
challenge is its scalability. While the method has been designed for use at the scale of a 
metropolitan area, there may be interest in scaling up to a state or national level. Scaling up to 
state-wide or nation-wide analysis with this approach would have three major challenges: data 
collection, computing power limitations, and fragility function limitations as I have discussed in 
detail in the chapter. These two challenges limit the potential for an all hazards power outage 
prediction model, which can be very valuable in helping understand business downtime and 







Appendix A: Synthetic Hurricane Generation 
 
Synthetic hurricanes are generated outside of the ABM using the four-step process developed 
in Staid et al.(1). These steps are: 
 a. Choose an initial windspeed and location for landfall: The US coastline is divided into 50 
km bins and the bins are populated by the number of hurricanes to make landfall within its 
boundaries. The initial location at landfall is randomly selected from these bins in proportion to 
historic landfall occurrences. The windspeed is sampled from the historical record; 
 b. Using the initial windspeed and location, generate a hurricane track from a non-
parametric random forest model trained on the suite of historical US hurricane tracks(1). The 
track reports the location of the center of the hurricane in six-hour increments; 
c. Compute the peak 3-second 10-m peak wind gust at the center of each parcel in 
the study area using a parametric hurricane wind field and decay model(2); 
d.  Discard any hurricane that does not impact the study region. 
 This is repeated until a library of 36,399 synthetic storms to impact the study region is 




Next, the case study area’s historic hurricane intensity and frequency records are fitted to 
Poisson and Weibull distributions, respectively, to form baseline hurricane scenarios as shown in 
equations (3) and (4): 
𝑁𝑖~𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝑐𝐹)             (3) 
𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥~𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝐼, 𝛽)             (4) 
Here 𝑁𝑖 is the number of hurricanes that impact the case study area in year 𝑖, 𝑐 is the 
historical annual frequency with which hurricanes make landfall in the study region and equals 
0.1373, and 𝐹 is the multiplier that controls hurricane frequency. 𝐹 = 1.0 implies the baseline 
case. 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum windspeed for each sampled hurricane. The parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 
describe a two-parameter Weibull distribution fitted using historical maximum hurricane 
windspeed in this region, where 𝛼 = 67.76 and 𝛽 = 3.64. 𝐼 is the multiplier that controls 
hurricane intensity by changing the scale parameter. 𝐼 = 1.0 implies a baseline case. These 
distributions are used in the ABM to sample both the number of hurricanes that occur in a year 
and the intensity of each hurricane. The synthetic track in the library with the maximum 3-
second peak wind gust closest to the sampled hurricane landfall windspeed is selected.  
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Appendix B: Decision Model 
 
For the decision-making model, we use a decision tree to enumerate all possible alternatives 
that an agent can choose given their previous upgrade history. In each simulated year with at 
least one hurricane, each agent chooses from a set of alternatives that increases the wind 
resistance of their house or do nothing. We use utility theory to model each agent’s preference. 
In the simulation, each agent’s parcel is initially assigned a building type, which is extracted 
from the Maryland Department of Planning9. There are 11 building types, defined by the 
building materials and number of stories. Examples of these are a single-story wood-framed 
homes and a two-story unreinforced masonry homes. For each building type, different upgrading 
options to reduce wind damages are available (e.g., adding roof-to-wall straps). For each type of 
building and given upgrade alternative (if any) selected, we use the fragility curve which 
estimates the probabilities of that building being in each of the possible damage states (i.e., 
damage states 1-4) from a given windspeed from HAZUS. Each agent incorporates this fragility 
function with their probabilistic beliefs about the frequency and intensity of hurricanes to 
calculate the expected utility of each alternative and then choose the alternative with the highest 






upgrade does not decay as time progresses in the simulation. A detailed description of build 
stock information can be found in Reilly et al. 
We define the current state of a house as 𝑠0, which is the combination of its building type and 
upgrades previously done to that house. The potential future states of the house are denoted as 
𝑠𝑖, 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, where 𝑛 is the number of different alternatives the homeowner has for upgrading 
their house. A cost 𝑐𝑖, 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 is associated with each choice. After a storm, the house can 
either be not damaged or in one of four different damage states (from minor damage to 
completely destroyed) with damage costs 𝑐𝑑0, 𝑐𝑑1, 𝑐𝑑2, 𝑐𝑑3, 𝑐𝑑4 equal to 0, 0.05,0.2,0.45, and 
0.99 times the house value 𝑊.  
The agent updates their estimates of the probability of occurrence of each category of 
hurricanes written as 𝑝𝑗 , 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 7, corresponding to the probability of no hurricane, a tropical 
storm, and Category 1-5 hurricanes. This is updated each year based on new observations by the 
agent in each simulated year. The probability of being in each damage state 𝑘, 0 ≤  𝑘 ≤ 4,  
given the average wind speed for each category of hurricanes and the potential state of the house 
is defined as 𝑝(𝑑𝑘|𝑠𝑖, 𝐻𝑢𝑟𝑟 𝑗), 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 7. We assume the agent knows these probabilities when 
making mitigation decisions. We use a risk averse exponential utility function shown in equation 
(1) to quantify the preference over outcomes 
𝑈(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑒−𝑥/𝑅                                                               (1) 
where R is the risk aversion factor. In the model we select R to be 0.05 ∗ 𝑊 where 𝑊 is the 
wealth of each agent. We use the house value as a proxy for wealth because we lack household-
level net worth information. As a result, wealthy people can afford more expensive upgrades and 




The agents also consider the long-term return from their investment on house upgrades, i.e., 
what is their return over the next 𝑇 years with a discount factor 𝛾. 𝑇 = 10 and 𝛾 = 0.03 in our 
model. Here the return on their investment is defined based on how much damage is reduced if 
they take that action given their assessment of the risk. Hence, we can calculate the expected 
utility considering long-term return using equation (2). 
𝐸𝑈(𝑠𝑖|𝑠0) = ∑ 𝑝(𝑗) ∑ 𝑝(𝑑𝑘|𝑠𝑖, 𝑗)𝐿𝑈(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑑𝑘)𝑘∈[0,4]𝑗∈[1,7]                          (2) 
Where 𝐸𝑈(𝑠𝑖|𝑠0) is the expected utility for a house in state 𝑠0 to upgrade to 𝑠𝑖, and 
𝐿𝑈(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑑𝑘) is the long-term utility if the house is in damage state 𝑘 
𝐿𝑈(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑑𝑘) = 𝑈(𝑤 − 𝑐𝑑𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖 ) + ∑ 𝑈 ((𝑤 − 𝑐𝑑𝑘) ∗
1
(1+𝛾)𝑡
)𝑇𝑡=1 .                    (3) 
𝑈(𝑤 − 𝑐𝑑𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖 ) is the utility value when implementing the upgrade in the current year, and 
∑ 𝑈 ((𝑤 − 𝑐𝑑𝑘) ∗
1
(1+𝛾)𝑡
)𝑇𝑡=1  is the utility with this upgrade over the next T years. At the end of 
each year, based on the agent‘s perception of hurricane occuring, each agent identifies the state 







Appendix C: Mortality Model 
 
This model was developed by Brooke Anderson at Colorado State University as part of a 
collaborative project funded by the National Science Foundation Hazard-SEES program. My 
advisor Dr. Guikema was the PI on this grant. This was not my work, but the details of the model 
are being reported here to provide needed details and context for the mortality model I used the 
Agent Based Model. 
a) Developing the training dataset for the predictive health risk models 
The heat mortality module of the ABM was developed in a series of steps. First, they created 
a dataset of the estimated mortality effects of previous heatwaves, as well as characteristics of 
those heatwaves like their length and intensity, to use as a training dataset to fit predictive 
models linking a heat wave’s characteristics to its expected mortality impacts in three age 
categories. 
To develop this training dataset, they used daily time series of health and weather data from 
the National Morbidity, Mortality, and Air Pollution Study (NMMAPS) data set for 83 high-
population communities from 1987–2005 [1]. These data included a separate time series for each 
of the 83 communities, with aggregated daily mortality counts for three age groups (< 65 years, 
65–74 years, and ≥ 75 years), as well as daily weather characteristics. Within these time series, 
they identified heatwaves as periods in which average daily temperature was at or above the 98th 
percentile of the year-round daily temperature values for that community for at least 2 




They estimated the mortality risk associated with each of these heatwaves using an 
epidemiological modeling approach that is standard in heat-health research, comparing the 
observed rate of mortality to that expected without the heatwave using a generalized linear model 
framework that leveraged the full time series for each community [2], [4]. Age-specific (< 65 
years, 65–74 years, ≥ 75 years) log relative risks of mortality for each heatwave were estimated 
using an overdispersed Poisson generalized linear model of daily all-cause mortality regressed on 
the occurrence of a heat wave, controlling for long-term seasonal trends (using a natural cubic 
spline) and day of the week for each heat wave [2], [3]. Since some associations were estimated 
with greater variance (e.g., due to shorter heat wave duration or a smaller populations in the 
community), Bayesian pooling was used to stabilize these estimates. This was done by taking the 
posteriors of the estimates, drawing those estimates with greater uncertainty closer to the mean 
risk of mortality for a heat wave [5]. 
To complete the training dataset, they measured 20 characteristics of each heatwave that, a 
priori, they identified as potential modifiers of the mortality risk associated with the events. 
These characteristics included duration of the heat wave, average temperature during the heat 
wave, and maximum temperature during the heat wave, as well as a number of hybrid 
characteristics that combined duration and intensity, a number of characteristics that 
characterized intensity of the heatwave relative to the climate of the community, rather than 
through an absolute measure of temperature, and characteristics of the community in which the 
heat wave occurred. They also included the community in which a heatwave occurred as a 
predictive variable in this models, allowing them to predict estimates specific to Baltimore when 
applying the models.  




Using this training dataset, they trained three 1,000 tree random forest models (one for each 
age category) to predict the expected age-specific risk of a heatwave based on its duration, 
intensity, and other measured characteristics. They trained these models using the randomForest 
R package [6], tuning them using 10-fold cross-validation to optimize for the number of model 
parameters considered at each node split. 
c) Applying predictive model within the ABM 
These random forest models were incorporated into the ABM to predict the mortality risk for 
each heatwave for model agents in each age category. The output of the predictive model was 
further adjusted within the ABM to account for access to air conditioning (A/C) among the 
model agents during each heatwave, as modeled through other components of the ABM. 
The initial predictions from the random forest models represent risk given a community’s 
baseline A/C prevalence. During power outages, the availability of A/C among model agents 
decreases from this baseline prevalence, while other factors (e.g., opening cooling centers in the 
community or access to air conditioned refuges through social connections) can increase 
availability of A/C among the model agents above Baltimore’s baseline A/C prevalence. To 
adjust the predictions from the random forest model based on each model agent’s individual 
access to A/C, the heat-mortality module of the ABM adjusted the initial random forest 
predictions based on results from O’Neill, Zanobetti, and Schwartz, who found a 1.4% decrease 
in the association between heatwaves and mortality risk for every 10 percentage point increase in 
the proportion of the community with home air conditioning[7]. A similar A/C prevalence effect 





Based on these results, the following equation was used to adjust community- and age-
specific mortality risk predictions from the random forest model based on an agent’s access to 
A/C during the heatwave [7]: 
𝛽 = 𝐶0 − 0.14𝑃𝐴𝐶 
In this equation, 𝛽 is the log relative risk for mortality during a heat wave for the city 
population given a certain prevalence of homes with A/C within the community (𝑃𝐴𝐶 , taking a 
value from 0 for a community in which no homes have central A/C to 1 for a community in 
which all homes have central A/C). The intercept, 𝐶0, represents the log relative risk for a 
community with 𝑃𝐴𝐶 = 0. 
In making this adjustment, we assumed that the overall mortality risk predicted by the model 
represented a mixture of the individual-level risks of residents with and without access to A/C in 
the community. Based on American Housing Survey data (United States Census Bureau 2020), 
the baseline prevalence of A/C in Baltimore homes over the period covered by the training data 
(1987–2005) was approximately 60%. Under this assumption, the heat-mortality module uses the 
predicted log relative risk calculated for the heatwave and age group from the random forest 
model as 𝛽 and Baltimore’s baseline A/C prevalence of 0.6 for 𝑃𝐴𝐶  to solve for 𝐶0 for each heat 
wave and age category. It then estimates the agent-level risk for each heatwave separately for 
agents without access to A/C (setting 𝑃𝐴𝐶 = 0) and for agents with access to A/C (setting 𝑃𝐴𝐶 =
1). 
Finally, the heat-mortality module within the ABM applied a standard health impact 
assessment approach to estimate the number of deaths expected among the model agents during 




heat wave and its baseline probability of mortality if a heat wave had not occurred. Baseline 
probability of mortality for each agent was calculated as a function of the age-specific daily 
probability of mortality, using age-specific mortality rates for 1999 from the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, and the number of days in the heat wave. The probability of 
baseline mortality throughout each multi-day heat wave was calculated as the complement of the 
probability of survival on all days within the heat wave. The probability of mortality during the 
heat wave was then calculated by multiplying the agent’s predicted relative risk of mortality 
associated with the heat wave by the probability of daily mortality had the heat wave not 
occurred. These probabilities were then applied to each agent within the ABM to estimate the 
number of excess heatwave-related deaths among ABM agents during each heatwave in the 
simulation, and those values were then aggregated by year to estimate yearly excess mortality 
attributable to all heatwave events generated by the ABM for that year. 
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